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ABSTRACT
We investigate the role of industry specialization in horizontal cross-border merg-
ers and acquisitions. We find that acquirers from more specialized industries in a
country are more likely to buy foreign targets in countries that are less specialized
in these same industries. The role of industry specialization in foreign acquisitions
is more prevalent when contracting inefficiencies and exporting costs limit arms’
length relationships. The economic gains in cross-border deals are larger when spe-
cialized acquirers purchase assets in less specialized industries. These results are
consistent with an internalization motive for foreign acquisitions, through which
acquirers can apply localized intangibles on foreign assets.
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I Introduction
The last thirty years have witnessed a boom in cross-border mergers and acquisitions,
with a large range of countries and industries participating in the globalization of corpo-
rate acquisitions.1 A growing literature investigates the reasons why firms stretch their
boundaries internationally, and the locations in which they acquire assets. In this pa-
per, we argue and provide novel evidence that the volume, direction, and value creation
of cross-border acquisitions are related to firms’ willingness to deploy mobile intangible
advantages on foreign assets.
Our analysis builds on the internalization theory of international expansion that pre-
dicts that firms can create value through foreign acquisitions by internalizing markets
for some of their proprietary assets and expanding their use internationally within firm
boundaries rather than at arm’s length (e.g. Caves (1971) or Hymer (1976)). This mode
of global expansion should prevail when firms benefit from specific advantages that can
easily be transferred geographically, but that are difficult to exchange via market rela-
tionships in foreign countries. Hence, the types of assets that firms seek to deploy abroad
via foreign acquisitions are likely to be specific intangible resources, which are both highly
mobile and hard to trade at arm’s length (e.g. Markusen (1995)). According to the inter-
nalization motive, firms acquire control of assets overseas to profitably expand the scale
of mobile intangible advantages (e.g. knowhow or skills) on foreign targets’ immobile
capabilities (e.g. machines and equipment or distribution network).
We posit that firms’ mobile intangible advantages contain an important localized in-
dustry component which is reflected in the specialization of their industry. Indeed, a
large literature in economics shows that industry specialization reflects differences in the
relative efficiency of economic activities across countries as originally laid out by Ricardo
(1817) in his theory of comparative advantage. We postulate that these cross-country dif-
ferences in the relative efficiency of industries arise primarily because of differences in the
prevalence of industry-specific intangible assets as in Glaeser (2010)).2 Intangibles such as
1For instance, according to a recent report by Baker & McKenzie, there were more than 11,000 cross-
border acquisitions in 2014, valued at $1.3 trillion, surpassing every year on record, except 2007. In the
recent period, cross-border deals represents around 40% of all acquisitions, and comprises the largest
deals, such as the acquisition of Holcim by Lafarge in April for $39 billion.
2Ellison and Glaeser (1999) show that only 20% of industry agglomeration patterns can be ascribed
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knowhow or management skills typically concentrate geographically, generating agglom-
eration economies through localized knowledge flows (e.g. Porter (1990) or Ellison and
Glaeser (1999)). Examples of such industry clusters include watch-making in Switzerland,
information technology in the United States (“Silicon Valley”), or machinery and chemical
manufacturing in Germany. We argue that the presence of geographically concentrated
intangibles gives firms located in specialized clusters access to unique industry-specific
intangible advantages that can be deployed abroad via acquisitions.
Using specialization at the country-industry level to measure mobile intangible advan-
tages, we find strong support for the internalization motive for cross-border acquisitions.
We conduct our analysis on a large sample of 36,105 horizontal cross-border deals cumu-
latively valued in excess of $3.2 trillion involving private and public acquirers and targets
from 46 countries and 85 industries over the period from 1990 through 2010. Across
175,950 industry-country pairs (46 × 45 × 85 combinations of countries and industries)
we find that the intensity of acquisition flows between two countries (e.g., Switzerland and
the US) in a given industry (e.g., watches) is positively related to differences in their spe-
cialization in that industry (e.g., specialization of the Swiss and American watch industry).
Even after controlling for a host of country determinants of cross-border acquisitions (e.g.
size, economic development, or institutional quality), firms in more specialized industries
acquire control of assets in less specialized industries. The role of industry specialization
is economically large. For the average industry, a one standard deviation increase in the
difference in specialization between two countries is associated with an increase of 14.6%
in the number of deals, and a 56.5% increase in aggregate transaction value.
The strong link between industry specialization and cross-border acquisitions is per-
vasive and highly robust. It persists after we control for various country-industry charac-
teristics that are known to explain foreign acquisition activity and that could be related
to differences in specialization, such as differences across countries in industries’ size, val-
uation, access to capital, governance, product market competition, or global economic
importance. In addition, we conduct extensive robustness tests to make sure our results
hold under alternative specifications, including for instance different definitions of indus-
tries, or datasets to construct industry specifications. Also, our results are robust to
to natural cost advantages, leaving localized intra-industry spillovers a likely candidate for the remaining
fraction.
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several changes in specification and econometric choices. In particular, our findings are
robust to the inclusion of industry-country-pairs fixed effects, which rules out explanations
based on time-invariant differences between countries and industries.
We provide additional evidence supporting the importance of deploying mobile in-
tangible advantages as a motive for foreign acquisitions. First, using various measurable
proxies for intangible resources (e.g., patents, skilled labor, or management efficiency) we
document that the intensity of cross-border deals is stronger when the acquiring indus-
try benefits from more human and technology capital compared to the target industry.
Second, we show that the association between industry specialization and the acquisition
of foreign assets is stronger when alternative channels to exploit intangible advantages
abroad are less attractive than stretching firms’ boundaries overseas. In particular, we
find that the role of industry specialization in cross-border acquisitions is stronger when
the contracting environment of target countries is weak. Consistent with the internaliza-
tion motive, firms increasingly expand the use of their intangible advantage abroad by
acquiring control of foreign assets when contracting inefficiencies between private parties
in foreign markets limit arm’s length relationships. Similarly, the relation between indus-
try specialization and cross-border acquisitions is stronger when exporting costs are high,
i.e., when the cost of shipping products or services that directly embeds firms’ specific
advantages increases.
We also examine cross-border acquisitions at the deal level, focusing directly on dif-
ferences of industry specialization between participating firms. Mirroring the aggregate
results, we observe large differences in the degree of specialization between acquiring and
target firms. Overall, more than 60% of all transactions involve acquirers that are more
specialized than targets. Across all transactions, the difference in specialization is eco-
nomically substantial as acquirers display levels of specialization that are roughly 25%
larger than that of targets. This pattern is pervasive as it holds in every year of the
sample, and is present across the vast majority of countries and industries. We also find
in multivariate tests that country-industry specialization predicts firms’ participation in
cross-border transactions after controlling for firms’ characteristics. Compared to a large
set of possible transactions, actual observed transactions are more likely to occur between
an acquirer and a target when the difference in their industry specialization is large.
3
In the final section, we show that the economic gains realized in cross-border transac-
tions are positively related to firms’ ability to deploy mobile intangible advantages abroad.
We find that transactions’ announcement returns and the premium that acquirers pay are
related to differences in industry specialization. Both acquirers’ and targets’ abnormal
returns are significantly larger when differences in industry specialization are large. A
one standard deviation increase in the difference in industry specialization between ac-
quirers and targets is associated with a 0.2% increase in acquirer returns, and with a 2%
increase in target return. When we focus on the subset of deals with both acquirers and
targets are publicly-traded, the link between specialization and combined returns is pos-
itive, but insignificant. We also find that acquirers pay a higher premium to take control
of less specialized foreign targets. Finally, we find that acquirers’ (one- and three-year)
accounting performance post-acquisition is significantly higher when acquirers are from
more specialized industries than targets.
Our evidence of an internalization motive for acquisitions adds to the growing litera-
ture examining the determinants of the volume and direction of cross-border acquisitions.
Existing studies emphasize various other benefits motivating foreign acquisitions. For
instance, cross-border transactions allow acquirers to improve targets’ legal environment
and investors’ protection (e.g. Bris and Cabolis (2008), Rossi and Volpin (2004) or Chari,
Ouimet, and Tesar (2010)), reach larger product markets (e.g. Yeaple (2003) or Giovanni
(2005)), optimize tax rules (e.g. Huizinga and Voget (2009)), access favorable regulations
(e.g. Karolyi and Taboada (2014) or Alimov (2015)), exploit differentials in currency and
stock market valuation (e.g. Erel, Liao, and Weisbach (2012) or Aguiar and Gopinath
(2005)) or privileged access to financing (e.g. Alquist, Mukherjee, and Tesar (2014)).
Other studies indicate that the benefits of acquiring foreign assets are larger when trans-
actions occur between firms that are culturally close (e.g. Ahern, Daminelli, and Fracassi
(2015)), and when institutional investors are present (e.g. Ferreira, Massa, and Matos
(2010)). Adding to these well-known determinants, our paper is the first to provide
empirical evidence supporting an internalization motive for cross-border acquisitions.3
3There are two related papers that focus on exporting skill as a reason for cross-border mergers without
focusing on the underlying reason for exporting. Brakman, Garretsen, and Marrewijk (2007) look at a
sample of cross-border mergers between five OECD countries and document that acquirers are more likely
to come from sectors that have a comparative advantage in exporting. Similarly, Feliciano and Lipsey
(2010) document the acquisitions of U.S. firms tend to occur in industries in which the acquiring country
has a comparative advantage at exporting.
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Importantly, our tests are specifically designed to control for the existing determinants in
order to isolate the unique role of industry specialization in cross-border acquisitions.
Our results are also linked to previous work emphasizing the importance of intangible
assets for firms’ multinational expansion (see Caves (2007) for a comprehensive survey).
Existing research indicates that multinationals primarily operate in R&D intensive in-
dustries (e.g. Harris and Ravenscraft (1991) or Yeaple (2003)) but does not examine the
importance of cross-border acquisitions. Closer to our paper, Morck and Yeung (1992)
reports that the stock market reaction to foreign acquisitions by US firms is larger for
R&D intensive acquirers, and recent micro-evidence reveals that multinational compa-
nies transfer technology and management practices to their existing foreign affiliates (e.g.
Branstetter, Fisman, and Foley (2006), Bloom, Sadun, and Reenen (2012), or Guadalupe,
Kuzmina, and Thomas (2012)). We add to existing research that builds on the internal-
ization theory by showing that firms’ mobile intangible advantages are associated with
industry specialization and explain the flow and direction of foreign acquisitions in a sam-
ple of transactions that include a large set industries, developed and emerging countries,
and private and public firms. Thus, our analysis emphasizes the role of industry-specific
intangibles that firm can access domestically, and extend abroad via acquisitions.
Our analysis is also part of a growing initiative among finance researchers to better un-
derstand the role of firms’ intangible resources in general, and their links with acquisitions
in particular. For instance, recent research emphasizes the importance of labor consider-
ations (e.g., John, Knyazeva, and Knyazeva (2015) or Tate and Yang (2016)), innovative
assets (e.g., Phillips and Zhdanov (2013) or Bena and Li (2014)), or organizational cap-
ital (e.g., Li, Qiu, and Shen (2016)) for acquisitions. We add to this line of research by
showing that, in an international context, industry-specific intangible advantages arising
from agglomeration economies that firms can deploy abroad plays a significant role in
explaining cross-border acquisitions and their consequences.
Finally, our findings are consistent with the recent theoretical industrial organization
models to study the motives for international acquisitions. Neary (2007) predicts that
after market liberalization firms with a cost advantage will purchase assets in markets
with a comparative cost disadvantage. Nocke and Yeaple (2007)) indicate that the most
productive firms will expand abroad by acquiring foreign non-mobile capabilities. To the
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extent that acquirers’ cost advantages stem from localized industry specialization, our
results provide strong empirical support for these predictions.
II Specialization and Cross-Border Acquisitions
Our conceptual framework combines the implications of the internalization theory of
multinational expansion with the literature indicating that the geographical specialization
of industries reflects the localized concentration of intangible assets (e.g., Glaeser (2010)).
This section first presents the economics of internalization as a motive for foreign acqui-
sitions, then develops the idea that intangible advantages contain an important localized
component specific to each country-industry combinations. The importance of industry
arises from industry agglomeration economies whereby firms in specific areas with high ge-
ographic concentration of firms in particular industries can develop and exploit intangible
assets by drawing on specialized information in local labor and supplier markets.
A The Internalization Motive for Acquisitions
The internalization theory of multinational expansion predicts that firms acquire foreign
assets in order to profitably deploy proprietary resources abroad (e.g., Caves (1971),
Hymer (1976), and Dunning (1977)). As summarized by Markusen (1995), this prediction
holds under three conditions. First, a firm must possess mobile specific advantages to
which other firms do not have access, conferring the firm some market power or cost
advantages that can be applied to foreign assets. Second, it must be profitable for the
firm to produce abroad rather than directly export to foreign markets. Third, the firm
must possess an internalization advantage that makes it more profitable to exploit mobile
specific advantages within its own boundaries via control rather than at arm’s length
through market relationships. The type of specific advantages that induce taking control
of foreign assets are thus likely to originate from intangible assets, such as knowhow,
proprietary knowledge, management skills, trade secrets, patents, or reputation. Indeed,
such knowledge-based assets can generally be easily transferred geographically, can be
used in many locations at low cost as they benefit from large economies of scale (unlike
physical capital), and are more difficult to exchange at arm’s length.
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To illustrate the internalization motive for foreign acquisitions, imagine an industry
with two firms, one located in Switzerland and the other in the United States. The
markets are completely segmented, such that both firms have production and sales in
their own country. Each firm possess domestic immobile assets Ach and Aus (e.g. a
factory), and mobile intangible advantages γch and γus (e.g., production knowhow) that
cannot be exploited at arm’s length (i.e., outside of firms’ boundary). The value of a firm is
simply determined by applying mobile advantage to the immobile assets it owns, γA (e.g.,
Garicano and Rossi-Hansberg (2006)). The internalization theory predicts that a cross-
border acquisition occurs if at least one firm can increase its value by applying its mobile
intangible advantage to the foreign immobile assets it purchases. This occurs if γchAus >
γusAus (i.e., the Swiss knowhow improves the productivity of the American factory), or
if γusAch > γchAch (i.e., the American knowhow improves the productivity of the Swiss
factory). If both conditions prevail, the identity of the acquiring firm – the direction of
cross-border acquisition – depends on whether γch is larger or smaller than γus. The Swiss
firm is the acquirer if γch > γus, whereas the American firm is the acquirer if γus > γch.
When γch = γus no value is created by reallocating ownership of assets across borders
and no acquisition occurs. The internalization theory thus predicts that cross-border
acquisitions involve acquiring firms possessing mobile intangible advantages purchasing
foreign target owning immobile assets (e.g., machines, equipment, or distribution network)
on which they can profitably deploy their advantages.4
Using the above example, it is conceivable that the firm with the lowest mobile specific
advantage finds it valuable to acquire the other firm to access its mobile specific advantage
and apply it on its existing domestic assets, leading to a “reverse internalization” (e.g.,
Blonigen (1997)). This scenario would however require the acquirer to possess precise
information about the target firm’s mobile proprietary intangible advantages, and also
the ability to easily repatriate such advantage on its domestic assets. The intangible
nature of the mobile advantages underlying the internalization motive for acquisitions
makes both conditions less likely in reality.5 In practice, there is considerable uncertainty
4Note that while the internalization motive has been developed to understand firms’ international
expansion, internalization forces could also be at work domestically. Although our focus is to understand
whether the internalization motive explains cross-border acquisitions, we report in the Internet Appendix
a preliminary test suggesting that the internalization motive is also related to the intensity of cross-state
acquisitions in the United States.
5While ultimately an empirical question, our empirical evidence is largely inconsistent with such a
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about the correct value of firms’ proprietary intangible resources (e.g., Cohen, Diether,
and Malloy (2013)), and about the ability to retain the valuable intangibles (e.g., talents
and knowhow) of acquired firms (e.g., Buono and Bowditch (1989) or Young, Tong, and
Fleming (2015)).
B Industry Specialization Advantages
The intangible advantages that firms can deploy abroad are likely to contain a localized
industry component that makes it easier to use and develop intangible assets. This compo-
nent can arise from the ability to hire specialized employees or scientists and also to have
specialized suppliers of goods and services that enable intangible assets to be produced.
As first pointed out by Adam Smith and David Ricardo, specialization reveals specific
skills: individuals and firms have incentives to specialize in the tasks that they do best.
Similarly, countries possess comparative or absolute advantages in certain activities, and
they specialize in these activities to capitalize on these local advantages (e.g. Costinot
(2009) or Costinot and Donaldson (2012)). As a result, the observed specialization of
countries into specific activities reflects differences in the relative efficiency of industries
geographically. Examples of such specialized industry clusters include watch-making in
Switzerland, information technology in the United States, or machinery and chemical
manufacturing in Germany.
While the geographical specialization of industries could arise for reasons other than
intangible advantages (e.g., access to unique natural resources or cheap labor), a volumi-
nous literature in economic geography shows that the localized specialization of industries
is strongly related to the geographic concentration of intangible resources (see Glaeser
(2010) for a comprehensive survey of agglomeration economies). In particular, the liter-
ature indicates that only a small fraction of the geographic specialization of industries
can be explained by observable sources of natural advantages (e.g., Ellison and Glaeser
(1999)).6 Furthermore, the accumulation of intangible assets tend to cluster in specific
locations (e.g., Kerr (2010) or Ellison, Glaeser, and Kerr (2010)). Such concentration
reverse internalization.
6Note that there is no theoretical prediction of industry specialization based on resource advantage or
immobile factor endowments leading to international expansion and cross-border acquisitions, in contrast
to specialization driven by mobile intangibles.
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generates agglomeration economies within industries as firms benefit from the presence
of neighboring peers and specialized suppliers (e.g., Porter (1990)). In turn, localized
agglomeration economies accelerate the development and diffusion of specific intangibles,
which ultimately lead to productivity growth.
The presence of localized knowledge assets give firms a unique local industry advan-
tage that distant rivals cannot match, in addition to their own proprietary advantage.
Benefits from agglomeration economies can take the form of information flows, faster
adoption of new technologies, increased access to skilled people and specialized knowl-
edge, or a strong reputation for quality products and services. Geographical proximity
enable neighboring firms to capitalize on localized industry-specific intangibles in their
development and growth, as if they had greater scale (e.g. Ellison and Glaeser (1997) or
Porter (1998)). We argue that firms located in specialized industrial clusters can extend
the benefits of localized intangible advantages abroad through foreign acquisitions. For
instance, a firm located in Silicon Valley has access to a large local pool of talent, ideas,
or knowhow that can be extended to foreign assets. On this ground, we rely on the geo-
graphical specialization of industries to measure mobile intangible advantages that firms
enjoy locally and that they can deploy on the foreign assets they acquire.
The use of industry specialization to study cross-border acquisitions is also justified
in light of recent theory that relies on formal industrial organization models to study
cross-border acquisitions (e.g. Neary (2007) and Nocke and Yeaple (2007)). For instance,
according to Neary (2007), after market liberalization that allows for foreign expansion
through acquisitions, firms with a cost advantage – specialized firms – will purchase assets
in markets with a comparative cost disadvantage.7
C Testable Hypotheses
Combining the predictions of the internalization theory with industry specialization mea-
sured at the country-industry level to capture firms’ mobile intangible advantages (γch
7In a Cournot-Nash model, a cross-border horizontal acquisition typically eliminates a competitor and
thus produces a bigger advantage for the remaining competitors than for the acquirer itself. Yet, Neary
(2007) shows that if the cost differential is sufficient, the acquirer will still find the acquisition valuable
if it can lower the production cost of the target. In other words, the value of acquiring foreign assets
originates in the ability of the acquirer to apply its existing domestic costs to operate the acquired assets.
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and γus), we formulate our main hypothesis:
Hypothesis 1 (main hypothesis) The flow of cross-border acquisitions from an acquirer to
a target country in a given industry increases with the difference in specialization between
the acquirer and target country in that industry, all else equal.
The internalization theory offers several ancillary predictions. In particular, Markusen
(1995) highlights that the need for firms to acquire formal control of foreign assets to
exploit mobile intangible advantages abroad is more prevalent when alternative modes of
global expansions are more costly. One possible alternative is for firms to exploit mobile
intangible advantages abroad at arm’s length through foreign contractual relationships
(e.g., a licensing agreement) instead of by expanding their boundaries through control.
Yet, a large theoretical literature emphasizes that intangible assets are difficult to exchange
at arm’s length in situations in which the protection of property rights is limited and
contracts between private parties are difficult to enforce. In these situations, acquiring
control enables a firm (i.e., the buyer) to internalize the potential loss of intangibles that
would take place from a contract (e.g. Klein, Crawford, and Alchian (1978), Williamson
(1979) or Grossman and Hart (1986)). On this ground, we expect acquiring control of
foreign assets to deploy intangible advantages (i.e., the internalization motive) to be more
attractive than alternatives when target counties feature weak contractual environments.
In these cases, the link between differences in industry specialization and the flow of
cross-border acquisitions should be be stronger. This constitutes our second hypothesis:
Hypothesis 2 The positive association between cross-border acquisitions and differences
in industry specialization between an acquirer and target country is stronger when the
target country’s contractual environment is weak.
Another alternative to acquiring control of foreign assets to reach foreign markets
is to exploit intangible advantages to produce at home and export products or services
to foreign markets. Exporting is however a costly activity due to tariff, quotas, and
transportation costs. Relying on the literature on tariff jumping arguing that firms expand
abroad to avoid the costs associated with exports (e.g. Krugman, Obstfeld, and Melitz
(2011)), we conjecture that the internalization motive of acquiring control of foreign assets
to deploy mobile intangible advantage is heightened when exporting costs are large (e.g.
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Nocke and Yeaple (2007)). We thus expect the relation between differences in industry
specialization and the flow of cross-border acquisitions to be stronger when exporting is
more costly. This insight generates our third hypothesis:
Hypothesis 3 The positive association between cross-border acquisitions and differences
in industry specialization between an acquirer and target country is stronger when trade
costs are large.
Finally, our last hypothesis concentrates around the value created by cross-border
acquisitions. Acquisitions occur when the value of controlling foreign assets exceeds the
costs of taking formal control of these assets. The internalization motive implies that
the value associated with foreign control increases with the ability of an acquirer to
deploy its mobile intangible advantages on the acquired foreign assets. Following the
literature on acquisitions (e.g., Betton, Eckbo, and Thornburn (2008)), we measure the
value associated with taking control of foreign asset using the stock market reaction (for
acquirers and targets) to deal announcements and the premia paid by acquirers for taking
control of the foreign assets. On this ground, we postulate that at the deal-level:
Hypothesis 4 The stock market reactions and control premia in cross-border acquisitions
increase with differences in industry specialization between the acquirer and target firms.
III Measuring Industry Specialization
A Definition and Measurement
To measure the degree of specialization of each country in specific industries (country-
industry observations), we borrow the concept of “revealed comparative advantage” that
is extensively used in the literature on international trade. As explained in Krugman,
Obstfeld, and Melitz (2011) a country is considered to have an advantage in a given
industry when the importance of that industry’s exports relative to the rest of the world’s
exports in that industry is large. Following the theoretical considerations discussed in
Section II, countries tend to be specialized in industries in which they have specific local
advantages, and specialization further enhances such advantage through economies of
scale and agglomeration effects. Thus we measure industry specialization in terms of the
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economic importance of industries, and not exports.
Following the original formulation by Balassa (1965), we define wi,c,t as the share of
industry i’s production (or employment) in country c’s total production (or employment)
in year t. Similarly, we define wi,t as the average share of industry i’s production world-
wide, computed as 1
Nc
∑
cwc,i,t, where Nc is the number of countries in our sample. We
then define industry specialization, SP , as follows:
SPc,i,t =
wc,i,t
wi,t
(1)
At time t, country c is defined as being “specialized” in industry i if the share of i’s
production (wc,i) in country c’s total production is larger than the average share of i’s
production worldwide (wi,t). Hence, a country is relatively specialized in industries for
which SPc,i,t is higher than one, i.e., when production in these industries is more than
expected on the basis of the average importance worldwide. As a result, a higher value
of SPc,i,t indicates a higher degree of specialization in industry i.
To fix ideas, consider that the watch industry represents 0.8% of the total Swiss
output in a given year (i.e., wch,watch,t = 0.008), while in the rest of the world, the
watch industry only accounts for only 0.02% of countries total output on average in
that year (i.e., wwatch,t = 0.0002). Our definition implies that (as shown empirically
below) that Switzerland is highly specialized in manufacturing watches and clocks (i.e.,
SPch,watch,t =
0.08
0.002
= 40). This is because the output share of the watch industry (in
the total Swiss output) is much larger in Switzerland than in any other country. In our
analysis we remain agnostic about the exact origin of specialization. To wit, we abstract
from the reasons why Switzerland is highly specialized in manufacturing watches, but use
this empirical fact as evidence that watch producers located in Switzerland benefit from
a clear localized advantage in producing watches compared to the rest of the world.8
We use disaggregated firm-level data for publicly listed companies from Worldscope
to measure specialization for each country-industry-year observation (SPc,i,t). We focus
on the period 1990 to 2010. We consider two variables to capture industries’ importance:
sales and employment. We define industries based on three-digit International Standard
8See Costinot (2009) for more about the origin of specific advantage and specialization. We discuss
the potential endogeneity of our measure of specialization in Section IV.E.
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Industrial Classification of All Economic Activities (ISIC Rev. 3) used by the United
Nations Statistics Division.9 We thus classify each firm in Worldscope into a three-digit
ISIC code using the primary SIC codes provided by Worldscope and the correspondence
between ISIC and SIC described in Appendix 2. We further exclude natural resources
industries.10
The starting sample comprises 1,067,534 observations on 50,886 distinct firms, corre-
sponding to 46 countries, 89 industries, and 21 years. Ideally, we would like to compute
SPc,i,t for every country-industry-year observation, that is 85,974 observations (46×89×21).
However, Worldscope does not contain sales or employment data for each possible country-
industry-year observation.11 Thus, we impose a minimum of three countries with non-
missing industry-year observations on sales or employment (across 46 countries) to remain
in the sample, and exclude all industry-year observations that do not meet this require-
ment. This steps eliminates 5,520 industry-year observations with missing sales, and
5,796 observations with missing employment, corresponding to four industries. For the
remaining observations, we assume that a missing country-industry-year observation re-
flects the absence of economic activities in these industries, and set wc,i,t to zero.
12 Out
of 85,974 possible observations, we have 80,454 (non-missing) measures of specialization
based on sales (SP (sales)) and 80,178 based on employment (SP (emp)) spanning 85
distinct industries.
[Insert Table 1 Here]
Table 1 presents descriptive statistics on the measures of industry specialization across
countries. Panel A reveals that, by construction, the average level of specialization world-
wide is equal to unity. Notably, the within-country distribution of specialization is highly
skewed. The large skewness indicates that many industries are present in each country in
9https://unstats.un.org/unsd/cr/registry/regcst.asp?Cl=2
10We exclude natural resources industries because the geographical specialization in natural resources
industries are likely due to direct access to natural resources (e.g., natural gas in Russia, Oil in Venezuela,
or Copper in South Africa), and not because agglomeration externalities stemming from intangible re-
sources (our focus). Moreover, anecdotal evidence suggest that acquisitions in natural resource industries
occur primarily because firms want to obtain access to natural resources. We show in the Internet
Appendix that we obtain similar results is we include these industries in the analysis.
11This happens because of incomplete coverage or because of the absence of publicly traded companies
in every industry and every country.
12All our results continue to hold if we only consider non-missing observations to compute wi,c,t. The
resulting sample is however much smaller.
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similar proportion (i.e. non-specialized industries), but only a few industries account for
a disproportionately large fraction of each country’s activities. We also note an important
heterogeneity in the average degree of specialization across countries. For instance, the
United States, Japan, Australia, or Switzerland display a large average degree of special-
ization (all well above unity – indicating more diversity in highly specialized industries)
compared to countries like Venezuela, Hungary, or Czech Republic. The large variation
in the average degree of specialization across countries suggests that some countries are
inactive in certain industries and thus display no output or employment in these industries
(i.e., wc,i,t = 0).
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Panel B of Table 1 presents the two most specialized industries in each country, where
specialization is based on sales and averaged over the period 1990-2010. We note, for
instance and as indicated above, that the most specialized industry in Switzerland is
the “Manufacture of watches and clocks”. Germany is specialized in “Retail trade”, the
UK in “Legal, accounting, and auditing activities”, Russia in “Transport via pipeline”,
and the US in “Renting of transport equipment” and “Education”. We also observe a
large heterogeneity of specialized industries across countries, including both tradable and
non-tradable industries.14
B Does Specialization Capture Mobile Intangible Advantages?
To assess the validity of using industry specialization as a broad proxy for mobile intangi-
ble advantage, we check whether our measures of industry specialization (SP (sales) and
SP (emp)) are positively related to market power or cost advantages, and, importantly,
measurable dimensions of intangible resources. Reassuringly we find strong support for
this claim.15 To examine the relation between industry specialization and mobile intangi-
13We notice that developed countries exhibit higher average degrees of industry specialization, reflecting
a more diverse industrial base. This is not an issue for our analysis because our tests focus on differences
between country-pairs and we directly control for such factors. Moreover, we show in the Internet
Appendix that our results hold when we focus on distinct country-pairs where differences in development
and specialization are small, and when we only consider country-industry observations that have non-zero
output or employment.
14Note that the internalization motive is also relevant for non-tradable industries (e.g. services). Indeed,
firms in non-tradeable industries possessing valuable intangibles should have high incentives to acquire
foreign assets to expand the scale of their intangible advantage.
15While industry specialization is also very likely partially determined by resource and factor en-
dowment differences, the component of industry specialization driven by immobile resource and factor
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ble advantages, we use firm-level data from Worldscope to compute the average price-cost
margin and the ratio of cost of goods sold to sales for each country-industry-year. Due to
data limitations, we can measure margins and costs for only half our sample. To preserve
space, we present details about the construction of all variables used in the analysis in
Appendix 1. The first two rows of Table 2 reveal that specialization is positively linked
to margins and negatively linked to costs, after controlling for country, industry, and year
fixed effects.16
[Insert Table 2 Here]
The rest of Table 2 relies on various sources (with unequal coverage) to construct prox-
ies for intangible resources. Overall, we find strong support that industry specialization
is indeed related to mobile intangibles. Rows (3) and (4) show that specialization is pos-
itively related to the fraction of skilled workers in each country-industry-year. Similarly,
rows (5) and (6) display a positive link between specialization and the stock of software
capital, as well as the stock of information and communication technology capital (ICT).
Data for these tests are obtained from the EU KLEMS Growth and Productivity Accounts
database (KLEMS). Rows (7) and (8) highlight that more specialized industries exhibit
a larger stock of R&D capital, as well a higher R&D intensity, measured by aggregating
firm-level data from Worldscope across countries, industries, and year. In row (9), we
consider the ratio of patent to assets using the NBER patent database and focus on US
industries only. More specialized industries in the US display a higher patenting intensity.
Finally, in row (10) we collect data on management quality from the World Management
Survey (WMS) described in Bloom, Genakos, Sadun, and Reenen (2016). We aggregate
the survey-based data on management practice across countries and industries. Although
not statistically significant, we estimate a positive relation between the specialization of a
country in a given industry and the average level of management quality of firms operating
in this industry that are headquartered in this country.
endowments would not predict international expansion via mergers and acquisitions. Thus, the immobile
component would weaken our results and work against our hypotheses that mergers and acquisitions are
related to mobile intangible resources.
16These estimates are conservative given the variation absorbed by the various fixed effects. Results
from pooled regressions deliver similar results but with stronger statistical significance.
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IV Determinants of Acquisition Flows
A Mergers and Acquisitions Data
To examine the interplay between differences in specialization and acquisition flows across
countries and industries, we consider public, private and subsidiary acquirers and targets.
Using the degree of specialization of industries to measure mobile intangible advantages
provides a practical benefit to study cross-border acquisitions because specialization can
be measured for a large set of countries and industries. This practical feature enables
us to test the implications of the internalization motive for virtually all cross-border
transactions. In particular, we can include in our analysis acquisitions involving private
firms (as acquirers or targets), as well as firms from emerging markets.
We obtain a sample of transactions from the Security Data Corporation’s (SDC) Merg-
ers and Corporate Transaction database that includes all deals (domestic and cross-border,
public and private) announced between 1990 and 2010 that are completed by the end of
2012. We restrict our attention to deals where the acquirer takes formal control of the
target, that is, deals in which the acquirer owns more than 50% of the target’s shares
after the transaction.17 Similar to Erel, Liao, and Weisbach (2012) we exclude LBOs,
spinoffs, recapitalizations, self-tender offers, exchange offers, repurchases, partial equity
stakes, acquisitions of remaining interest, privatizations, as well as deals in which the
target or the acquirer is a government agency.
We limit our attention to the 46 largest countries (see Table 1). This subset represents
93% of all SDC transactions and 96% of the world equity market capitalization (in 2010).18
We only retain transactions where both the acquirer and target have non-missing mea-
sures of specialization (this eliminates 1,048 transactions). Our sample includes 365,496
transactions with a total value of $21 trillion. We use the primary Standard Industrial
Classification (SIC) provided by SDC to assign each acquirer and target to one of 85
distinct ISIC industries.
[Insert Table 3 Here]
17Note that we are unable to measure the actual voting rights of acquirers, nor the potential existing
stakes of acquirers’ parent companies if acquirers are subsidiaries. We show in the Internet Appendix,
however, that our main results are unaffected if we restrict to acquisitions in which the acquirer buys
100% of the target’s shares in the transactions, or if we only consider acquisitions of non-subsidiaries.
18This figure is based on data from the Worldbank in 2010.
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Table 3 displays the characteristics of the sample of global mergers and acquisitions.
Panel A indicates that during the sample period 22.2% of all transactions (81,139) involve
firms from different countries. Cross-border deals have a total value of $5.9 trillion, or
27.4% of all deal value.19 Among the possible 2,116 country pairs (46×46), 1,571 (70.8%)
feature at least one transaction. On average, firms in a given country are involved in deals
in 34 different countries. Notably, 73% of all cross-border transactions (and 83% of total
deal value) occur between firms from developed countries, where development levels are
taken from the Standard and Poor’s Emerging Market Database.
Relevant for our investigation, acquisitions comprise a strong horizontal component.
Across all deals (domestic and cross-border) 44% occur between firms operating in the
same industries (i.e., when the primary 3-digit ISIC code of the acquirer is the same as that
of the target). This fraction is roughly similar between domestic deals and cross-border
deals. There is a total of 36,105 cross-border horizontal transactions, representing a total
value of $3.2 trillion or 54% of all cross-border transactions. These transactions are the
main focus of our analysis. Notably cross-border horizontal deals span a non-negligible
part of the potential global network in each industry. Across the 175,950 possible horizon-
tal cross-border pairs (46 × 45 × 85), 11,433 (or 6.5%) feature at least one transaction.
The average industry has horizontal deals involving 125 country-pairs.
B Empirical Specification
To estimate the relationship between differences in industry specialization and the flow
and direction of horizontal cross-border acquisitions, we follow Ahern, Daminelli, and
Fracassi (2015) and Karolyi and Taboada (2014) and use a specification that resembles
gravity models used to study trade flows (e.g. Anderson and van Wincoop (2004) or
Anderson (2011)). Our baseline specification is as follows:
log(1 + Vc,c′,i) = α + β∆SPc,c′,i + γXc + δXc′ + ηXc,c′ + υi + εc,c′,i, (2)
where Vc,c′,i is the aggregate volume of horizontal acquisitions in industry i between ac-
quirer country c and target country c′. We use two measures for V : the total number of
19UNCTAD (2013) reports a cumulative cross-border M&A volume of $7.18 trillion worldwide for the
1990-2010 period. Including natural resources, our sample contains cross-border deals with a combined
value of $6.5 trillion, and thus appears to cover 90% of the global volume based on values.
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acquisitions (#Acq.) and the total dollar value of acquisitions ($Acq.). The variable of
interest, ∆SPc,c′,i measures the difference in specialization between countries c and c
′ in
industry i. The vectors Xc, Xc′ , and Xc,c′ include several acquirer and target country-level
characteristics, as well as country-pair characteristics (e.g. common border or language).
The vector υi includes industry fixed effects.
The coefficient of interest in equation (2) β measures whether, for a given industry
i, the intensity of cross-border acquisitions between (acquirer) country A and (target)
country B is related to differences in their specialization in industry i, after controlling for
a host of country and industry characteristics. Our main hypothesis predicts a positive
β coefficient, indicating that for a given industry i acquisitions flow from countries that
are more specialized in i (e.g. watch-making in Switzerland) to countries that are less
specialized in i (e.g. watch-making in the United States).
Note that when the expected acquisition benefits are negative we should observe no
transaction. As a result the dependent variable Vc,c′,i is naturally truncated at zero.
In our context, this happens frequently as industry-country pairs featuring at least one
transaction over the 1990-2010 period represents only 6.5% of the sample. We account for
this truncation by estimating equation (2) using a Tobit model. We further account for
the possible within-country correlation by clustering standard errors at the acquirer and
target country level. In our baseline tests, we focus primarily on cross-sectional variation
and ignore the time-series dimension (that we consider in Section IV.E). Thus in our cross-
sectional tests, we take the average values of all variables over the sample period. We
collapse all 21 years into a single cross-sectional regression with 175,950 industry-country
pairs (46 × 45 × 85 combinations of acquirer country, target country, and industry).20
As a result of this aggregation, Xc and Xc′ capture country-level effects. Any effect that
occurs because the acquirer country is larger or more developed than a target country is
absorbed by the country variables. Similarly, any effect that occurs because of a particular
industry characteristic is absorbed by υi.
Following previous research, we control for a host of country factors in our tests (Xc,
Xc′ , and Xc,c′). We use data from the Worldbank on annual GDP and GDP per capita to
20Note that by using industry specialization to capture firms’ mobile intangible advantages our analysis
is not constrained to focus on a small number of transactions for which we can disparately measure some
forms of intangibles for acquirers and targets.
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capture a country’s size and level of development, and data from the World Integration
Trade Solution (WITS) to compute bilateral trade flows (imports and exports) between
any two countries. We obtain data on the average corporate tax rate for each country
from the Economic Freedom Index. We also identify if two countries have double-taxation
and bilateral investment treaty agreements for each year in our sample from the United
Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) database. We obtain national
exchange rates from Datastream, and define the nominal exchange rate returns (between
each pair of countries) as the average annual difference in the logarithm of the monthly
exchange rate. We obtain real exchange rate returns by using each country’s consumer
price index and convert all nominal returns to the 2000 price level for Europe. We use data
from Djankov, La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, and Shleifer (2008) to capture different legal
origins. We also consider language and religion as cultural factors related to cross-border
acquisitions and gather data on the primary language spoken in each country (English,
Spanish, or Others) from CIA World Factbook 2008. We also consider the dominant
religion in each country (Catholic, Protestant, Muslim, Buddhist or Others). We further
obtain the geographical distance between each country’s largest city (in terms of popula-
tion) or its capital from the Centre d’Etude Prospective et d’Information Internationale
(CEPII), as well as a dummy variable that is equal to one if two countries share a common
border. Summary statistics for all variables used in the baseline regression are presented
in the Appendix.
C Baseline Results
Table 4 present the main results. Notably, the estimated coefficients on ∆SP are positive
across all specifications, irrespective of whether we measure specialization based on sales
(∆SP (sales)) or employment (∆SP (emp)), and whether we focus on the number or value
of cross-border acquisitions. All estimates are highly significant with t-statistics ranging
between 7.9 and 11.9. Consistent with our hypothesis that foreign acquisitions reflect
firms’ willingness to deploy mobile specific advantages abroad, the flow of cross-border
acquisitions in a given industry within a pair of countries increases with the difference in
their specialization of this industry. The economic magnitude of the effect of specialization
differences on the intensity of cross-border acquisitions is substantial. A one-standard
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deviation increase in ∆SP (sales) is associated with a 14.6% increase in the number of
deals (#Acq.), and a 56.5% increase in the aggregate value of deals ($Acq.). Similarly,
a one-standard deviation change in ∆SP (emp) is associated with 13.3% more deals, and
an aggregate value of deals that is larger by 49.6%.21
[Insert Table 4 Here]
The baseline specifications contain a large number of control variables, capturing ef-
fects that are known to correlate with cross-border acquisition activity. The estimates
reported in Table 4 are in line with previous research. For instance, larger economies
(measured by log GDP) participate more in cross-border acquisitions. More developed
countries, as measured by their GDP per capita, also feature more cross-border horizon-
tal transactions. We also see more cross-border deals when country-pairs display more
bilateral trade and are geographically closer. Consistent with the idea that a currency
appreciation makes foreign assets look cheaper in nominal terms, we find a positive link
between currency return (i.e., an appreciation of the acquirer currency relative to the
target currency) and cross-border deal flows. Moreover, bilateral transaction intensity
increases when countries share the same language or the same legal origin, but not when
they have the same religion.
Our results remain virtually similar if we replace the countries’ control variables with
country-pair fixed effects. We present the results in Panel A of Table 5. The stability of the
estimates confirms that the link between differences in industry specialization and cross-
border acquisition flows is not capturing time-invariant differences across country-pairs.
Indeed, the inclusion of country-pair fixed effects absorbs any fixed difference between
two countries (e.g. differences in legal origins or constant institutional settings), and thus
isolates the intensity and direction of bilateral acquisition flows across industries within
country-pairs.
[Insert Table 5 Here]
In the rest of Table 5, we assess whether our results are robust to alternative mea-
surements of specialization. Our baseline measure of industry specialization is arguably
imperfect because Worldscope only includes data for public firms. This could render
21The variables ∆SP are normalized to a unit variance so the coefficients reported in Table 4 and
following tables can be interpreted directly.
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our measures potentially biased towards activities that feature more public equity cap-
ital. We alternatively measure industry specialization based on three different datasets
containing aggregated industry-level data on output and employment for all firms (both
private and publicly traded) for subsets of countries, industries, and years: the United
Nations Industrial Development Organization (UNIDO) Indstat4 database, the Bureau
Van Dijk Amadeus database, and the KLEMS database. UNIDO covers 47 manufactur-
ing industries and 43 countries for the period 1990-2006, Amadeus covers all industries
for 14 European countries over the 1997-2006 period. KLEMS covers all industries (with
a coarser definition) for 25 European countries as well the US, Japan, Korea, and Aus-
tralia for the 1990-2006 period. While the size of the samples is considerably reduced in
these estimations, the estimated coefficients for ∆SP remain positive and significant in
all specifications. These results, together with a host of alternative tests presented in the
Internet Appendix, indicates that our findings are highly robust.22
D Country-Industry Characteristics
By design, the inclusion of acquirer and target country characteristics (or country-pair
fixed effects) in the baseline specification (2) guarantees that the coefficient on ∆SP is
not reflecting the role of country characteristics documented by existing research, such
as different quality of institutions, governance, openness, or economic development. Yet,
∆SP could still be correlated with peculiar industry characteristics that are known to
influence cross-border acquisitions, and that are not included in our baseline specification.
If this is the case, our inference and interpretation could be incorrect.23 We consider
22In the Internet Appendix, we estimate the baseline equation using OLS, a count model and the Poisson
Pseudo-Maximum-Likelihood (PPML) method developed by Silva and Tenreyro (2006) to capture the
count nature of the dependent variables (in the presence of many zeros). We include acquirer and target
country fixed effects instead of country level control variables. We add differences between acquirer and
target country variables instead of levels. We scale the flow (both in number and value) of cross-border
horizontal acquisitions in a given industry between two countries by the intensity of domestic horizontal
acquisition in the target industry. We consider different definitions of industries. We exclude observations
from the U.S. and the U.K. and estimate the baseline models across all country-pairs separately. We
replace our measure of specialization with one that excludes sales realized abroad. We consider separately
tradable and non-tradable sectors and consider separately mergers and acquisition of assets, as well as
distinct types of cross-border deals based on the public status of the acquiring and target firms.
23Note that we include acquirer and target country-industry fixed effects because our measure of bilat-
eral specialization is symmetric, in the sense that for a given industry i, the difference in specialization
between the acquiring country c and the target country c′, labeled as ∆SPc,c′,i is equal to −1×∆SPc′,c,i.
This implies that acquirer and target country-industry fixed effects (αc,i and αc′,i) are collinear with
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several possibly relevant variables measured at the country-industry level to dispel this
concern.
First, the specialization of industries in a given country might be related to the ab-
solute weight of these industries in this country rather than their weights relative to the
world averages. Thus, differences in industries’ size could be related to differences in
specialization patterns and also transaction intensity (e.g. Brainard (1997)). We measure
industry size using the (log of the) sum of firms’ assets as well the number of firms in
each country-industry. Second, specialization could be linked to the market valuation of
industries, which is related to international acquisitions (e.g. Erel, Liao, and Weisbach
(2012) or Aguiar and Gopinath (2005)). We compute the average market-to-book ratio
across all firms in each country-industry to measure industry valuation. Third, specializa-
tion could be facilitated by easier access to financing in some industries, which could also
drive cross-border acquisitions (e.g. Alquist, Mukherjee, and Tesar (2014)). We average
cash-to-asset and debt-to-asset ratio across all firms in each country-industry as proxies
for access to finance. Fourth, firms in specialized industries might exhibit stronger gov-
ernance, and this could explain their foreign acquisition activities (e.g. Rossi and Volpin
(2004)). We rely on the fraction of shares held by insiders to capture one dimension of
governance that is measurable for a large sample of firms, and take its average across each
country-industry as proxy for governance. Finally, we consider competition, as imperfect
competition could motivate international acquisitions by shielding acquirers from com-
petitive pressure in foreign markets (e.g. Caves (1971) or Neary (2007)). We measure the
intensity of competition in each country-industry using the Lerner Index following Nickell
(1996) and the Hirschman-Herfindahl index.
[Insert Table 6 Here]
To assess whether our results are threatened by these alternative explanations, we in-
clude the differences in each of the above characteristics between the acquirer and target
industries in the baseline specification (2). Because some country-industry observations
do not feature any publicly listed company in Worldscope, adding these country-industry
variables reduces the sample size by about half. We report these results in Table 6. The
first four columns of Table 6 reveal that the coefficients on ∆SP remain strongly positive
∆SPc,c′,i. Yet, the inclusion of country-industry-pair fixed effects in the panel specification partially
addresses this concern.
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in these alternative specifications. While differences in some industry characteristics are
significantly related to acquisitions (e.g. industry size or competition), the effect of spe-
cialization continues to be strong. Reflecting the fact that industry characteristics capture
some relevant variation in the data, the economic significance of ∆SP decreases by about
40% but remains substantial and highly significant. In the last four columns of Table 6
we further control for differences in country-industry “global market shares” to alterna-
tively capture industries’ global economic importance. We define the market share of a
given country-industry-year as the ratio of its sales (or employment) to worldwide sales
(employment) in that industry. As with the specialization measures, we assign a value of
zero to country-industries with no publicly listed firms, and aggregate this measure over
the whole sample period. We observe more transactions between two countries in a given
industry when the acquirer industry has larger market shares than the target industry.
Yet, the coefficients on ∆SP continue to be large and significant.
In all, the results in Table 6 largely dispel concerns that differences in industry special-
ization pick up the influence of industries’ size, economic importance, valuation, access
to finance, governance and competition on cross-border acquisitions highlighted by exist-
ing research. To the extent that the additional control variables capture some intangible
dimensions that firms could deploy abroad, the estimated coefficients on ∆SP in Table
6 represent a lower bound on the effect of mobile industry-specific intangibles on cross-
border acquisitions.
[Insert Table 7 Here]
To provide further evidence that differences in mobile intangible assets between country-
industries are related to acquisition flows, Table 7 presents estimates of our baseline
specification (2) where we replace differences in specialization (∆SP ) with differences
in proxies for human and technology capital in a given industry between country pairs
(that we used in Table 2). We observe positive coefficients for differences in the fraction
of skilled employees and management quality (not significant), indicating that there are
more horizontal transactions between two countries in a given industry when the acquiring
industry has a larger stock of human capital than the target industry. We also observe
positive coefficients for three out of four measures of technological capital. Consistent
with the internalization motive, the intensity of cross-border deals is stronger when the
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acquiring industry benefits from human and technology capital compared to the target
industry.
E Omitted Variables
While our results are consistent with our main hypothesis, our interpretation could be
biased by possible omitted variables. Indeed, both differences in industry specialization
and the intensity of cross-border acquisitions could be correlated with factors not in-
cluded in our estimations. To investigate the potential effect of omitted variables, we
take advantage of the panel structure of the sample. Introducing the time dimension
in the baseline equation (2) allows us to include industry-country-pair fixed effects, and
hence absorb any fixed difference across industry-country-pairs. The panel sample then
expands to more than 3.6 million observations (46× 45× 85× 21).24 By doing so, the co-
efficient of interest (β) in equation (2) measures how the volume of acquisitions in a given
industry-country-pair changes when the difference in specialization (∆SPc,c′,i,t) changes.
Panel A of Table 8 indicates that our conclusions continue to hold when we control
for unobserved differences between industry-country pairs (together with country-level
controls). The estimated coefficients on ∆SP are all positive and significant. Albeit
smaller, the economic magnitude of the specialization effect remains substantial. When
the difference in specialization in a given country-industry-pair increases by one standard
deviation, we observe an increase of about 1% (0.8% and 1.1%) in the number of deals in
this pair and a 8% (6.8% and 10.5%) increase in acquisition value. Panel B reveals similar
findings when we estimate the baseline equation (2) using the Fama and MacBeth (1973)
methodology.25
The results in Table 8 mitigate concerns about omitted variables that are fixed across
24With only 36,105 horizontal acquisitions during the sample period, the number of zeros in the de-
pendent variable inflate to more than 99% of the sample, pushing the unconditional deal incidence in a
given year-industry-country pair close to zero.
25The smaller economic magnitude is somewhat expected as the source of variation in these panel spec-
ifications is within industry-country pairs as opposed to between industry-country pairs in our baseline
(cross-sectional) estimation. The significance of ∆SP is further remarkable as industry specialization is
highly persistent across countries and industries. The autocorrelation estimates are 0.92 for SP (sales)
and 0.87 for SP (emp). In the Internet Appendix, we report results using OLS as (non-linear) Tobit
estimations with a large number of fixed effects could be inefficient and biased, as well as dynamic models
with a lagged dependent variable. The results are qualitatively similar.
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country-pairs and industries. Yet, we cannot completely rule out the possibility that
differences in industry specialization and cross-border acquisitions are jointly driven by a
time-varying unobserved variable. To truly invalidate our interpretation, however, such
an omitted variable should (1) vary over time within country-pair-industry, and (2) be
unrelated to the country-pair-industry characteristics included in Table 6.
F Contracting and Exporting Costs
To provide further support for the internalization motive, we now turn to the theory’s
ancillary predictions. Our second and third hypotheses predict that the link between
industry specialization and foreign acquisitions should be stronger when (1) target coun-
tries’ contractual framework is weak, and (2) when exporting costs are high. We test
these predictions using various proxies for contracting and exporting costs. First, we fo-
cus on the strength with which countries enforce private contracts to measure the quality
of target countries’ contractual framework. Following Acemoglu, Johnson, and Mitton
(2009), we use data on the time (in days) and the number of procedures required to en-
force a contract from the Worldbank’s Doing Business project. Alternatively, we use the
overall index of formality of legal procedures developed by Djankov, Porta, de Silanes,
and Shleifer (2003). For each variable, a higher value reflects greater costs and complexity
of enforcing contracts between private parties. Second, following the convention in the
trade literature (e.g. Anderson and van Wincoop (2004) or Anderson (2011)) we measure
exporting costs between any two countries using the geographic distance that separate
their capital cities and whether they share a common border. We also directly rely on
bilateral trade flows as a de facto measure of exporting costs, with larger flows indicating
lower costs.
To test whether the link between differences in industry specialization and foreign
acquisitions strengthens with contracting and exporting costs, we modify our baseline
specification (2) as follows:
log(1 + Vc,c′,i) = α + β0∆SPc,c′,i + β1Ψc,c′ + β2(∆SPc,c′,i × Ψc,c′) + ...+ εc,c′,i, (3)
where every baseline explanatory variable (∆SPc,c′,i, Xc, Xc′ , Xc,c′ , and υi) is interacted
with a measure of contracting or exporting costs (Ψc,c′). Our hypotheses predict that
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β2 > 0: firms rely more on foreign control to deploy specific mobile advantages abroad
when arm’s length contracting between private parties provide weaker legal protection of
the intangible advantages of acquirers in target countries, and when the costs of exporting
goods that embeds firms’ intangible advantages are large.
[Insert Table 9 Here]
Table 9 presents the results of these ancillary tests. To preserve space, we only report
the estimated coefficients on the interaction term of interest ∆SPc,c′,i × Ψc,c′ . Panel A
indicates that the relation between differences in industry specialization and cross-border
acquisitions is stronger when target countries costs of enforcing contracts are high. The
estimated coefficients β2 are positive and significant for every measure of contracting costs,
specialization, and acquisition flows. In line with the internalization motive, the results
indicate that firms increasingly expand the use of their intangible advantage abroad by
acquiring control of foreign assets when contracting inefficiencies between private parties
in foreign markets limit arm’s length relationships.26
Panel B also reveals that the role of industry specialization in cross-border acquisitions
is stronger when exporting costs are substantial. The estimated coefficients β2 are positive
when we measure exporting costs using geographical distance, indicating that the role of
industry specialization is more prevalent in cross-border acquisitions when it is more
costly to ship products abroad. Similarly, we estimate that the role of specialization is
weaker (i.e., coefficients β2 are negative) when countries share a common border and when
bilateral trade is more intense, i.e., when exporting costs are lower. Overall, results in
Table 9 are consistent with the idea that acquiring formal control of foreign assets is more
important when alternative ways to exploit specific advantages abroad are relatively more
costly.
V Deal-level Evidence
Our results so far provide strong evidence that the bulk of aggregate cross-border acquisi-
tions flows from more specialized to less specialized industries. In this section, we exploit
26Further consistent with the importance of acquiring control, we show in the Internet Appendix that
there is no significant association between difference in industry specialization and the intensity of cross-
border alliances and joint ventures.
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the fine granularity of our sample of acquisitions to provide additional evidence at the
individual deal-level to further support our main hypothesis.
A Profile of Acquirers and Target
Table 10 presents descriptive comparisons of the degree of industry specialization across
acquirers and targets in our sample of 36,105 cross-border horizontal transactions. Several
notable results emerge. First, the average values of SP for both acquirers and targets are
larger than one. This suggests that, perhaps unsurprisingly, takeover transactions mostly
involve firms operating in industries exhibiting significant degrees of specialization.
[Insert Table 10 and Figures A, B, C, and D Here]
Consistent with the internalization motive, acquirers in our sample display degrees of
specialization that are markedly larger than targets. Across all deals, the average value
of SP (sales) is 1.981 for acquirers and 1.458 for targets. Similarly, the median value
of SP (sales) is 1.235 for acquirers, but amount to 0.886 for targets.27 Overall, acquir-
ers’ specialization is roughly 25% larger than targets, and the differences are statistically
significant. Consistent with the aggregate evidence, this clear pattern indicates that for
cross-border transactions involving firms from the same industry, more specialized acquir-
ers buy less specialized target. Remarkably, the difference of specialization is economically
sizeable as we observe that more than 63% of all horizontal cross-border transactions in-
volves acquirers that operate in more specialized industries than targets. Together these
transactions amount to $2.3 trillion, or 67% of the total value of cross-border horizontal
transactions over our sample period.
Figures A, B, C and D highlight that the observed difference in specialization between
acquirers and targets at the deal-level is present across countries, time, and industries.
Figures A and B display the average difference in specialization (∆SP ) by acquirer and
target countries (sorted in ascending order). For acquirer countries, ∆SP is positive in 35
countries out of 46 countries. For target countries, ∆SP is positive in 40 countries, based
on sales (similar for employment).28 Figure C further confirms the finding that acquirers
27The fact that targets display average specialization above unity may appear surprising. We show
in the Internet Appendix that this is explained by (1) a mechanical selection effect whereby there is no
target in industries displaying zero output, and (2) by an unequal repartition of targets across countries.
28The corresponding figures for employment are contained in the Internet Appendix. Taiwan is an
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are more specialized than targets holds for every single year in our sample. Finally, Figure
D displays ∆SP by industry. Here again, ∆SP is positive in 72 distinct industries, and
negative in only 13 industries for sales (69 vs. 16 for employment). In all, a substantial
fraction of asset ownership reallocations across borders occurs between more specialized
acquirers and less specialized target firms.
B Selection Models
We further exploit the deal-level data to estimate whether differences in industry special-
ization predicts firms’ participation in cross-border horizontal transactions after control-
ling for observable firm-level factors (as well as country and industry factors). To control
for firm-level factors, we restrict our attention to the subsample of deals for which we have
data on both acquirers and targets. Of the 36,105 cross-border horizontal transactions
in our sample, only 680 feature both public acquirers and targets with data available in
Worldscope.29
To estimate whether differences in specialization affect the likelihood that a cross-
border transaction occurs between two firms in the same industry, we create an artificial
sample that comprises possible and actual transactions constructed from all firms partici-
pating in cross-border horizontal transactions. Specifically, for each industry-year featur-
ing at least one transaction, we create all possible transactions by pairing each acquirer
to each target within that industry-year.30 The logic is that, conditional on participating
in a cross-border transaction, an acquirer (target) could have found it more valuable to
acquire (be acquired by) other targets (acquirers). This procedure results in 14,610 dis-
tinct acquirer-target pairs, 680 of which are actual transactions. Using this sample, we
estimate probit models to measure the probability of observing an actual transaction as a
function of the difference in specialization between the acquirer and the target (∆SP ) as
well as differences in their specific characteristics. We consider acquirers’ and targets’ size,
market-to-book ratio, sales growth, cash-to-asset and debt-to-asset ratios, the fraction of
foreign sales, as well as domestic and global market shares.
outlier with very few deals.
29This ratio is similar to that of other related papers (e.g. (e.g. Erel, Liao, and Weisbach (2012) or
Ferreira, Massa, and Matos (2010)).
30Imagine that in a given industry-year, A acquires B and C acquires D. Possible pairs include (A,B),
(A,D), (C,B), and (C,D).
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[Insert Table 11 Here]
Table 11 displays the results of various selection models. For brevity, we only report
the estimated coefficient on ∆SP . The first column reports a baseline estimation that
only includes ∆SP (sales), industry, and year fixed effects. Mirroring our aggregate re-
sults, the estimates indicate that, compared to possible transactions, actual transactions
are more likely to occur when the difference in industry specialization between the ac-
quirer and the target is large. We observe similar results in the second column when
we include the acquirer and target country controls used in the gravity specification (2).
More importantly, the third column indicates that difference in industry specialization
between acquiring and target firms predicts deal occurrence when we control for acquir-
ers’ and targets’ individual characteristics. We obtain similar results when we focus on
specialization measured using employment in columns (4) to (6).
C Market Reaction and Acquisition Premium
As discussed in Section II, the internalization theory implies that cross-border acquisitions
should occur when the net expected value of controlling existing foreign assets and using
mobile intangible advantages is positive. On this ground, our fourth hypothesis predicts
that the overall expected change in value triggered by acquiring control of foreign assets
to increases with the difference in industry specialization between the acquirer and the
target. Following a long tradition in the literature on acquisitions, we rely on cumulative
abnormal stock returns (CAR) for acquirers and targets around deals’ announcements
and the premium paid by acquirers as proxies for the expected change in value generated
by the reallocation of control (e.g. Betton, Eckbo, and Thornburn (2008)).
We compute acquirer and target CARs over the three-day event window (-1,+1)
around the deal announcement (e.g. Bris and Cabolis (2008) or Ferreira, Massa, and
Matos (2010)). We estimate abnormal stock returns using as a benchmark model a two-
factor international market model, with local market return and the world-market return
(both from Datastream) as factors. We estimate the model using daily dollar-denominated
returns from the 250 days that precede deal announcements. We also compute value-
weighted combined acquirer-target CARs where the weights are defined based on the
relative market capitalization of both firms 10 days prior to deal announcement. To make
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sure that the CARs isolate information related to horizontal cross-border acquisitions, we
focus on deals where acquirers or targets are not involved in other types of deals during
the quarter that precedes deal announcement. We measure the premium paid by acquir-
ers to take control over targets’ assets using the price they offer relative to targets’ stock
prices 30 days prior to deal announcements, as reported by SDC. Panel A of Table 12
reveals that the average three-day CARs for acquirers and targets are 1% and 9.9% in our
sample of horizontal cross-border transactions. The average combined three-day CARs is
8.2%, and the average acquisition premium is 35%.
[Insert Table 11 Here]
To test whether difference in industry specialization between the acquirer and the
target in a given transaction is related to market reactions, or acquisition premia, we
regress CARs (or acquisition premia) on the difference of specialization between the ac-
quirer and target industries (∆SP ) as well as deal, firm, and country characteristics and
further include industry and year fixed effects. The firm (acquirer or target) and country
characteristics are similar to those used in previous tests. Deal characteristics include
(the log of) deal value, dummy variables for whether the acquirer (or target) is private
and whether the transaction is a merger, the number of bidders, the fraction of ownership
held by the acquirer prior to (i.e. toehold) and after deal completion, and whether the
acquisition is paid with stocks. We also control for firms’ and industry stock returns
computed using 250 trading days prior to the transaction.
Panel B of Table 12 presents the results. Consistent with our fourth hypothesis,
differences in industry specialization between acquirers and targets are associated with
significantly higher abnormal returns for both acquirers and targets. Across all available
deals, a one-standard deviation increase in ∆SP is associated with a 0.2 percentage
point larger acquirer return, and 2.1 percentage point larger target return. Although
positive, the coefficients on ∆SP are not statistically significant in the combined CARs
regressions, which are estimated on the subset of deals involving public acquirers and
targets. Consistent with this latter result, we estimate a positive link between differences
in specialization and the premium acquirers pay to take control of foreign targets. Our
estimates confirm that the expected change in value associated cross-border acquisitions
increases with differences in industry specialization, and that acquirers have to pay for
30
accessing these gains.31
D Ex Post Performance
As an alternative way to measure the expected change in value generated by cross-border
acquisitions we look at ex post transaction performance. An important obstacle to mea-
suring ex post acquisition performance is that two separate firms exist before the transac-
tion, and one or two firms might exist after the transaction, depending on the transaction
type. As in Hoberg and Phillips (2012) we avoid this issue by considering only the ex post
change in performance of acquirers, measured relative to the first set of numbers available
after the transaction effective date. We thus implicitly assume that performance accrues
over time as it takes time for specialized acquirers to deploy their intangible assets on
newly purchased foreign assets.32
We examine changes in return on assets from year t + 1 to year t + 2, or t + 4 (one-
and three-years horizons). As information on performance is available only for public
companies, we focus on public firms acquiring public or private targets in horizontal cross-
border transactions. To isolate the role of specialization differences on post-acquisition
performance, we restrict our attention to firms that only acquire assets in cross-border
horizontal transactions over the horizons we consider. Moreover, because changes in
performance can reflect underlying industry trends, we benchmark acquirers’ performance
by contrasting it to that of matched industry peers. For each acquirer, we select the
closest peer (by size) that (1) operates in the same country and industry, and (2) that is
not involved in any acquisition during a six-year window surrounding the transaction.33
[Insert Table 13 Here]
Table 12 reports the results of OLS regressions where the ex post changes in perfor-
mance (at different horizons) are the dependent variables. The sample includes 4,997
31Additional tests reported in the Internet Appendix indicate that our result are robust to using a
Heckman specification that attempts to account for the influence of self-selection.
32Note that by examining post-changes only we bias our analysis towards not finding results due to a
reduction in power, but we avoid complications of measuring performance in year t− 1.
33To mitigate the effect of outliers, we winsorize the performance measures at the 1% level. Moreover,
to reduce survivorship issues, we assign any missing values for a given horizon the value of the last known
horizon (as in Hoberg and Phillips (2012)). We exclude firm-year observations with negative reported
assets, but keep firm-year observations with negative earnings. Removing them does not change the
results, as shown in the Internet Appendix.
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acquisitions made by 3,636 distinct firms from 46 countries and 84 industries. All specifi-
cations include control variables as well as country-pairs, industry, and year fixed effects.
We observe that the estimated coefficients for ∆SP are positive across all performance
horizons and with both measures of specialization. They are significant in all four specifi-
cations. Thus transactions in which acquirers are more specialized than targets appear to
be associated with increased ex post performance. The results are economically substan-
tial. For instance, a one standard deviation increase in ∆SP (sales) is associated with an
increase in profitability of 0.60% over one year, and the same level of 0.60% is maintained
over three years.
We recognize that looking at acquirers’ ex post outcomes does not necessarily identify
the (causal) effects of cross-border transactions on performance. Our analysis indicates,
however, that differences in industry specialization between acquirers and targets are
associated with better performance. Consistent with our main hypothesis, this finding
suggests that the benefits of deploying intangible advantage abroad arise because of the
enhanced ability of specialized buyers to operate the acquired assets more efficiently.
VI Conclusions
The paper shows that differences in industry specialization are important in explaining
the flow, direction, and value creation of horizontal cross-border acquisitions. Our central
hypothesis is that industry specialization reflects the localized concentration of intangi-
ble resources that firms can deploy and internalize abroad within their own boundaries
through foreign acquisitions. Consistent with this internalization motive, we find large
differences in the degree of industry specialization between acquirers and targets in cross-
border transactions. Moreover, we find that the intensity of acquisitions between two
countries in a given industry is positively related to differences in their industry special-
ization.
Across a host of tests, we uncover that firms in more specialized industries acquire con-
trol of assets in less specialized industries. The intensity of cross-border deals is stronger
when the acquiring industry benefits from human and technology capital compared to
the target industry. Also, the role of industry specialization in cross-border acquisitions
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is stronger when alternative channels to exploit intangible advantages abroad are less at-
tractive than acquisitions. The relation between differences in industry specialization and
the intensity of cross-border acquisitions is stronger when contracting and exporting costs
limit arms’ length relationships and exporting. Furthermore, transactions’ announcement
returns and the premium that acquirers pay are related to differences in industry spe-
cialization. Both acquirers’ and targets’ abnormal returns are significantly larger when
differences in industry specialization are large. We also find that acquirers pay a higher
premium to take control of less specialized foreign targets and estimate that acquirers’
(one- and three-year) accounting performance post-acquisition is significantly higher when
acquirers are from more specialized country-industries than targets.
Our results suggest that firms’ willingness to deploy mobile intangible advantages
abroad is well captured by industry specialization and is important in explaining the
geography of global acquisitions. Moreover the economic gains triggered by the inter-
national reallocation of control are linked to the ability of specialized buyers to exploit
their mobile intangible advantages and operate the purchased assets more efficiently. Our
findings support the proposition that the existence and prevalence of localized specialized
intangible resources at the country-industry level are important factors in understanding
the flows, direction, and valuation effects of cross-border acquisitions.
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Appendix 1: Definition of the Variables
#Acq.: Number of cross-border horizontal acquisitions between two countries in a given indus-
try (Source: SDC)
$Acq.: Dollar value of cross-border horizontal acquisitions between two countries in a given
industry (Source: SDC)
SP(sales): Degree of specialization of an industry in a given country, computed as the share
of the industry’s sales in its country total sales, divided by the average share of sales in the
industry across all countries, aggregated across public firms in each country-industry (Source:
Worldscope and own calculations).
SP(emp): Degree of specialization of an industry in a given country, computed as the share
of the industry’s employment in its country total employment, divided by the average share
of employment in the industry across all countries, aggregated across public firms in each
country-industry (Source: Worldscope and own calculations).
GDP: Gross domestic product (Source: Worldbank)
GDP/capita: Gross domestic product per capita (Source: Worldbank)
Trade: Bilateral imports and exports (Source: World Integration Trade Solution (WITS))
Exchange rate return: Difference in the logarithm of the monthly real exchange rate (Source:
Datastream)
Distance: Geographic distance between capitals, calculated using the great circle formula and
latitudes and longitudes of the capital or most populous city (Source: CEPII).
Common Border: Dummy that equals one if two countries share a common border (Source:
CEPII).
Same Religion: Dummy that equals one if two countries share the same religion, defined as
the dominant religion of a country (Source: CIA World Factbook 2008).
Same Language: Dummy that equals one if two countries share the same language, defined
as the primary spoken language of a country (Source: CIA World Factbook 2008).
Same Legal System: Dummy that equals one if two countries share the same legal system
(Common, Civil, German, or Scandinavian) (Source: Djankov et al. 2006).
Corporate Tax Rate: Country corporate tax rate (Source: Economic Freedom Index).
Double-Tax Treaty: Dummy that equals one if two countries have signed a double-taxation
treaty (Source: UNCTAD).
Bilateral Investment Treaty: Dummy that equals one if two countries have signed bilateral
investment treaty (Source: UNCTAD).
Contracting Costs (procedures): Time in days required to enforce a contract (Source:
Worldbank).
Contracting Costs (duration): Number of procedures required to enforce a contract (Source:
Worldbank).
Contracting Costs (enforcement): (one divided by) the overall index of formality of legal
procedures (Source: Djankov, La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, and Shleifer (2003)).
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Margin: Price-cost margin ratio computed as operating profits before depreciation and amor-
tization over sales (Source: Worldscope)
COGS/Sales: Costs computed as cost of good sold over sales (Source: Worldscope)
High Skill (%comp): (country-industry) ratio of high-skilled labor compensation to total
compensation (Source: EU KLEMS variable LABHS)
High Skill (%hours): (country-industry) ratio of hours worked by high-skilled persons engaged
to total hours worked (Source: EU KLEMS variable H-HS)
Software (%capital): (country-industry) stock of software capital over total capital, in 1995
prices (Source: EU KLEMS variable K-Soft)
ICT Stock (%capital): (country-industry) stock of computing and communication equipment
of total capital, in 1995 prices (Source: EU KLEMS variable K-ICT)
R&D Stock: Stock of R&D capital computed using the perpetual inventory method Gi,t =
(1 − δ)Gi,t−1 + R&Di,t, where Gi,t is the end-of-period stock of R&D capital for firm i and
δ is the depreciation rate of R&D capital set to 15% as in Falato, Kadyrzhanova, and Sim
(2014) (Source: Worldscope)
R&D/Assets: Ratio of R&D expenditures to total assets (Source: Worldscope)
Patents/Assets: The number of patent divided by total assets, for US firms only (Source:
NBER patent Database and Compustat)
Management: Index of management quality (Source: World Management Survey)
Total Assets: Total Assets (Source: Worldscope)
Market-to-book: Book value of assets minus book value of equity plus market value of equity,
divided by the book value of assets (Source: Worldscope)
Debt/Assets: Total debt divided by total assets (Source: Worldscope)
Cash/Assets: Cash holdings divided by assets (Source: Worldscope)
1-Lerner: Measure of market power computed as one minus the average price-cost margin
ratio in an industry, where the price-cost margin is computed as operating profits before
depreciation and amortization over sales (Source: Worldscope)
HHI: Hirschman-Herfindahl index, defined as the sum of the squared market shares in the
industry (Source: Worldscope)
CHS: Closely-help shares, defined as the fraction of shares held by insiders, trusts, corpora-
tions, pension funds, and individuals who hold 5% or more of shares outstanding (Source:
Worldscope)
GMS(sales): Global market shares of an industry in a given country, computed as the share
of the country-industry’s sales in the global industry’s sales, aggregated across public firms
in each country-industry (Source: Worldscope and own calculations)
GMS(emp): Global market shares of an industry in a given country, computed as the share
of the country-industry’s employment in the global industry’s sales, aggregated across public
firms in each country-industry (Source: Worldscope and own calculations)
Acquirer CAR: Three-day cumulative abnormal return for acquirers around the deal an-
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nouncement date, obtained using a two-factor international market model with the local
market and world market returns as factors using dollar-denominated returns from the 250
days that precede the announcement (Source: SDC, Datastream, and own calculations)
Target CAR: Three-day cumulative abnormal return for targets around the deal announcement
date, obtained using a two-factor international market model with the local market and world
market returns as factors using dollar-denominated returns from the 250 days that precede
the announcement (Source: SDC, Datastream, and own calculations)
Combined CAR: Weighted average between acquirer and target CARs where the weights are
defined based on the relative market dollar capitalization of both firms 10 days prior to the
announcement (Source: SDC, Datastream, and own calculations)
Premium: Price paid by acquirers to take control of targets relative to targets’ price 30 days
prior to the deal announcement (Source: SDC)
ROA: Net income divided by total assets (Source: Worldscope)
Appendix 2: Mapping between ISIC and SIC
Our various data sources are based on different industry classifications, notably the US Stan-
dard Industrial Classification (SIC 1987) classification and the International Standard Industrial
Classification of All Economic Activities (ISIC Rev. 3) classification. To make the industry clas-
sification systems compatible, we define industries as the finest possible partition of industries
in the 3-digit ISIC Rev. 3 system such that the 3-digit SIC 1987 classification is a refinement
of this partition; that is, none of the 3-digit industries in the SIC 1987 has an intersection with
two or more industries in the partition of industries we define. This yields a partition of 101
industries. Existing concordances between ISIC and SIC classifications do not exclude overlap,
i.e. individual 3-digit SIC industries corresponding to more than one 3-digit ISIC industries,
and vice versa.
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Table 1: Measures of Industry Specialization – Descriptive Statistics 
 
This table presents descriptive statistics for our two main measures of industry specialization as presented in Section 
III.A. SP(sales) is specialization based on total sales, and SP(emp) is specialization based on total employment. Data 
on sales and employment are from Worldscope. The sample covers 46 countries, 85 distinct industries and the period 
1990-2010. Industries are defined based on three-digit ISIC classification (see Appendix 2). Panel A displays 
aggregate summary statistics (average, median as well as 10th and 90th percentiles) for each country. Panel B 
displays the two most specialized industries (highest SP(sales)) for each country aggregated over the whole sample 
period.      
 
Panel A SP(sales)    SP(emp)  
Country Average 10th Median 90th    Average 10th  Median 90th  
Argentina 0.51 0.00 0.00 0.78 0.34 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Australia 1.38 0.00 0.29 4.19 1.22 0.00 0.10 3.42 
Austria 0.76 0.00 0.00 1.99 0.81 0.00 0.00 2.56 
Belgium 0.88 0.00 0.00 2.50 1.02 0.00 0.00 2.73 
Brazil 0.51 0.00 0.08 1.50 0.67 0.00 0.00 2.10 
Canada 1.26 0.00 0.42 3.03 1.08 0.00 0.22 2.90 
Chile 0.75 0.00 0.00 2.26 0.79 0.00 0.00 2.50 
China 1.08 0.00 0.35 2.49 1.11 0.00 0.28 2.65 
Colombia 0.58 0.00 0.00 1.87 0.59 0.00 0.00 1.35 
Czech Republic 0.39 0.00 0.00 0.50 0.41 0.00 0.00 0.55 
Denmark 0.87 0.00 0.01 2.51 0.91 0.00 0.01 2.78 
Finland 1.00 0.00 0.04 2.45 1.10 0.00 0.04 2.61 
France 1.37 0.00 0.59 3.64 1.51 0.00 0.57 3.76 
Germany 1.50 0.00 0.31 3.24 1.47 0.00 0.31 3.31 
Greece 0.75 0.00 0.11 2.27 0.74 0.00 0.03 2.22 
Hong Kong 1.38 0.00 0.51 3.11 1.34 0.00 0.27 3.77 
Hungary 0.53 0.00 0.00 0.78 0.58 0.00 0.00 0.91 
India 0.96 0.00 0.23 2.71 0.74 0.00 0.00 2.00 
Indonesia 1.03 0.00 0.12 2.79 1.02 0.00 0.00 2.37 
Ireland 0.72 0.00 0.00 2.13 0.73 0.00 0.00 2.06 
Israel 0.80 0.00 0.00 2.06 0.61 0.00 0.00 1.80 
Italy 0.68 0.00 0.09 2.09 0.76 0.00 0.11 2.31 
Japan 2.02 0.08 0.91 6.10 2.00 0.10 0.66 5.74 
Korea 1.37 0.00 0.40 3.77 1.34 0.00 0.47 3.14 
Luxemburg 0.60 0.00 0.00 0.38 0.50 0.00 0.00 0.14 
Malaysia 1.22 0.00 0.55 3.55 1.10 0.00 0.03 3.32 
Mexico 0.94 0.00 0.00 2.94 0.76 0.00 0.00 2.20 
Netherlands 0.99 0.00 0.15 2.26 1.26 0.00 0.14 2.82 
New Zealand 1.15 0.00 0.00 3.18 0.92 0.00 0.00 1.40 
Norway 1.14 0.00 0.00 1.90 1.49 0.00 0.00 2.55 
Peru 0.54 0.00 0.00 1.75 0.40 0.00 0.00 1.18 
Philippines 0.75 0.00 0.00 2.11 0.67 0.00 0.00 1.56 
Poland 0.71 0.00 0.00 2.01 0.65 0.00 0.00 1.69 
Portugal 0.54 0.00 0.00 1.52 0.54 0.00 0.00 1.60 
Russia 0.44 0.00 0.00 0.66 0.40 0.00 0.00 0.87 
Singapore 1.70 0.00 0.55 4.21 1.41 0.00 0.00 4.20 
South Africa 1.28 0.00 0.28 3.56 1.29 0.00 0.17 3.31 
Spain 0.74 0.00 0.00 1.83 0.79 0.00 0.00 1.93 
Sweden 1.18 0.00 0.21 3.64 1.11 0.00 0.16 3.08 
Switzerland 1.81 0.00 0.14 4.30 1.99 0.00 0.13 3.30 
Taiwan 1.49 0.00 0.22 4.06 1.38 0.00 0.08 3.31 
Thailand 0.97 0.00 0.34 2.63 1.23 0.00 0.07 3.28 
Turkey 0.86 0.00 0.00 2.00 0.82 0.00 0.00 2.02 
UK 1.46 0.02 0.67 3.03 1.81 0.03 0.65 3.94 
USA 2.26 0.17 1.20 4.98 2.42 0.16 1.00 5.94 
Venezuela 0.15 0.00 0.00 0.18   0.18 0.00 0.00 0.00 
World 1.00 0.00 0.06 2.64   1.00 0.00 0.00 2.55 
 
   
Panel B Top#1 Top#2 
Argentina Manufacture of footwear Basic iron and steel 
Australia Repair of personal and household goods Advertising 
Austria Architectural, engineering and others Other wholesale 
Belgium Insurance and pension funding Retail sale of food, beverages and tobacco 
Brazil Education Retail trade in specialized stores 
Canada Repair of personal and household goods Printing and service activities 
Chile Education Sea and coastal water transport of freight 
China Non-scheduled air transport Education 
Colombia Spinning, weaving and finishing of textiles Beverages 
Czech Republic Tobacco products Casting of metals 
Denmark Sea and coastal water transport of freight Sea and coastal water transport of passengers 
Finland Television and radio transmitters Paper and paper products 
France Electric lamps and lighting equipment Tanning and dressing of leather 
Germany Retail trade not in stores Sale, maintenance and repair of motor vehicles 
Greece Human health activities Precious and non-ferrous metals 
Hong Kong Sea and coastal water transport of passengers Education 
Hungary Plastics products Refined petroleum products 
India Electric lamps and lighting equipment Education 
Indonesia Tobacco products Sale, maintenance and repair of motor vehicles 
Ireland General purpose machinery Dairy products 
Israel Insurance and pension funding Architectural and engineering activities 
Italy Aircraft and spacecraft Motor vehicle and equipment 
Japan Accumulators, primary cells, primary batteries Electrical equipment 
Korea Television and radio receivers Other wholesale 
Luxemburg Structural metal products, tanks, reservoirs  Basic iron and steel 
Malaysia Sale, maintenance and repair of motor vehicles Hotels and accommodation 
Mexico Glass and glass products Restaurants, bars and canteens 
Netherlands Renting of construction or demolition equipment Meat, fish, fruit, vegetables, oils and fats 
New Zealand Renting of transport equipment Legal, accounting, and auditing activities 
Norway Oil and gas extraction Non-scheduled air transport 
Peru Grain mill products and starched products Legal, accounting, and auditing activities 
Philippines Education Beverages 
Poland Renting of construction or demolition equipment Wearing apparel, except fur apparel 
Portugal Products of wood, cork, and straw Retail sale of food, beverages and tobacco  
Russia Transport via pipelines Railway and tramway locomotives 
Singapore Building and repairing of ships and boats Electronic valves and tubes 
South Africa Railway and tramway locomotives Chemical and Fertilizer Minerals 
Spain Railway and tramway locomotives Repair of personal and household goods 
Sweden Domestic appliances Wearing apparel, except fur apparel 
Switzerland Watches and clocks Electricity distribution,  wire and cable 
Taiwan Office, accounting and computing machines Casting of metals 
Thailand Miscellaneous Manufactures Manufacture of footwear 
Turkey Domestic appliances Glass and glass products 
UK Legal, accounting, and auditing activities Advertising 
USA Renting of transport equipment Education 
Venezuela Structural metal products, tanks, and reservoirs Monetary intermediation 
   
Table 2: Mobile Intangible Advantages and Industry Specialization 
This table presents the associations between proxies for mobile advantages (margins, costs, and intangible assets) 
and industry specialization. We consider two measures of industry specialization, one based on sales (SP(sales)) and 
one based on employment (SP(emp)). Data on sales and employment are from Worldscope. We measure 
associations by separately regressing each variable of interest on our measures of industry specialization as well as 
various fixed effects (depending on the specification). We report the estimated coefficients on industry specialization 
(SP), their t-statistics, sample size, the fixed effects structure (which depends on the unit of observation of each 
specific variable), as well as the sample source. Panel A presents the link between industry specialization (country-
industry-year observations), margins and costs (COGS/sales). Panel B presents the associations between industry 
specialization and measures of intangible assets. We consider the fraction of high skilled workers, the stock of 
software capital, the stock of information and communication technology (ICT) capital, the stock of R&D assets, the 
ratio of R&D to assets, all measured at country-industry-year level, the ratio of patent to assets measured at the 
industry-year level for US industries only, and management quality measured at the country-industry level. All 
variables are defined in Appendix 1. Industries are defined based on three-digit ISIC classification (see Appendix 2). 
Symbols *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. 
SP(x): SP(sales) SP(emp) FE? Source 
  Coef t-stat N   Coef t-stat N       
Panel A: Margins and Costs 
Margin 0.121*** (7.61) 43,817 0.107*** (5.86) 43,798 C/I/Y Worldscope 
COGS/sales -0.001 (-0.20) 41,516 -0.057*** (-2.76) 41,500 C/I/Y Worldscope 
Panel B: Intangibles 
High Skill (%Comp) 0.364*** (8.51) 23,838 0.181*** (3.64) 23,718 C/I/Y KLEMS 
High Skill (%Hours) 0.304*** (7.50) 23838 0.120** (2.54) 23,718 C/I/Y KLEMS 
Software Stock 0.124*** (3.64) 13,930 0.238*** (6.11) 13,860 C/I/Y KLEMS 
ICT Stock 0.016 (0.46) 13,930 0.127*** (3.62) 13,860 C/I/Y KLEMS 
R&D Stock 0.199*** (3.38) 2,737 0.222*** (3.58) 2,737 C/I Worldscope 
R&D/Assets 0.119*** (6.48) 43,916 0.117*** (5.54) 43,897 C/I/Y Worldscope 
Patents/Assets  0.087* (1.67) 1,749 0.027 (0.36) 1,749 I/Y NBER  
Management 0.161 (1.54) 527 0.075 (0.71) 527 C/I WMS 
                      
 
  
Table 3: Mergers and Acquisitions - Descriptive Statistics 
This table describes the sample of mergers and acquisitions. Data are from the SDC Platinum M&A Database. We 
include all mergers and acquisitions where more than 50% of the target shares are owned by the acquirer after the 
transaction. We exclude LBOs, spinoffs, recapitalizations, self-tender offers, exchange offers, repurchases, 
acquisitions of remaining interests, privatizations as well as deals involving government agencies. The sample period 
is 1990-2010. We display the breakdown of transactions across domestic, cross-border, horizontal and non-horizontal 
for the whole sample. We present the number of deals, the dollar value, the fraction of all deals, and cross-border or 
domestic deals. Industries are defined based on three-digit ISIC classification (see Appendix 2). 
Deal Type: Total Domestic Cross-Border 
    
Panel A: All Deals 
    
# Deals 365,496 284,357 81,139 
% of Total 100% 77.80% 22.20% 
$ Value $21,612 $15,694 $5,918 
% of Total 100% 72.60% 27.40% 
    
Panel B: Horizontal Deals 
    
# Deals 162,098 125,993 36,105 
% of Total 44% 34% 10% 
% of Domestic/Cross-Border - 44% 44% 
$ Value $10,671 $7,472 $3,199 
% of Total 49% 34% 15% 
% of Domestic/Cross-Border - 47% 54% 
    
Panel C: Non-Horizontal Deals 
    
# Deals 203,398 158,364 55,034 
% of Total 56% 43% 13% 
% of Domestic/Cross-Border - 56% 56% 
$ Value $10,941 $8,222 $2,719 
% of Total 51% 38% 13% 
% of Domestic/Cross-Border - 53% 46% 
Table 4: Baseline Results 
This table presents cross-sectional Tobit estimations of the baseline gravity specification (equation (2) in the text). 
The dependent variable is the total flow of acquisitions, in number (ln(#Acq.)) or dollar value (ln($Acq.)), in a given 
industry-country-pair over the 1990-2010 period. The variable of interest, ∆SP, is the average difference in 
specialization (in a given industry) between the acquirer and the target country over the sample period. We consider 
two measures of specialization, one based on sales (SP(sales)) and one based on employment (SP(emp)). The 
control variables include average acquirer and target country characteristics, as well as country-pair characteristics. 
All variables are defined in Appendix 1. All specifications include industry fixed effects, with industries defined based 
on three-digit ISIC classification (see Appendix 2). To facilitate economic interpretation, all dependent variables are 
standardized to have a unit variance. Standard errors are clustered at the acquirer-target country-pair level. We 
report t-statistics in parenthesis. Symbols *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, 
respectively.  
Dependent Variable: ln(#Acq.) ln($Acq.) 
SP(sales) SP(emp) SP(sales) SP(emp) 
∆SP 0.146*** 0.133*** 0.565*** 0.496*** 
(11.93) (11.40) (8.69) (7.92) 
       
log(Acq. GDP) 0.360*** 0.360*** 1.085*** 1.084*** 
(6.41) (6.38) (4.13) (4.10) 
log(Tar. GDP) 0.269*** 0.269*** 0.928*** 0.928*** 
(5.13) (5.12) (3.75) (3.74) 
log(Acq. GDP/capita) 0.466*** 0.464*** 1.561*** 1.552*** 
(13.74) (13.67) (10.30) (10.23) 
log(Tar. GDP/capita) 0.073** 0.074** 0.207 0.21 
(2.35) (2.37) (1.46) (1.47) 
log(Bilateral Trade) 0.623*** 0.623*** 2.730*** 2.729*** 
(5.73) (5.71) (5.20) (5.17) 
Exchange Rate Return 0.118*** 0.120*** 0.479*** 0.489*** 
(4.71) (4.81) (4.33) (4.42) 
log(Distance) -0.279*** -0.279*** -0.775*** -0.776*** 
(-5.66) (-5.65) (-3.23) (-3.22) 
Shared Border -0.008 -0.008 -0.205* -0.205* 
(-0.34) (-0.34) (-1.82) (-1.82) 
Same Religion -0.004 -0.004 -0.193* -0.193* 
(-0.16) (-0.16) (-1.73) (-1.73) 
Same Language 0.228*** 0.228*** 1.014*** 1.015*** 
(8.11) (8.11) (8.12) (8.11) 
Same Legal Origin 0.166*** 0.166*** 0.591*** 0.589*** 
(5.89) (5.87) (4.63) (4.61) 
log(∆Tax Rate) -0.024 -0.024 -0.184* -0.184* 
(-1.16) (-1.15) (-1.95) (-1.95) 
Double-Tax Treaty -0.042* -0.042* -0.092 -0.092 
(-1.93) (-1.95) (-0.91) (-0.92) 
Bil. Investment Treaty -0.018 -0.019 -0.139 -0.14 
(-0.87) (-0.88) (-1.44) (-1.45) 
     
#Obs. 175,950 175,950 175,950 175,950 
Pseudo R2 0.32 0.32 0.23 0.23 
 
Table 5: Alternative Specifications 
This table presents alternative cross-sectional Tobit estimations of the baseline gravity specification (equation (2) in 
the text). The dependent variable is the total flow of cross-border horizontal acquisitions, in number (ln(#Acq.)) or 
dollar value (ln($Acq.)), in a given industry-country-pair over the 1990-2010 period. The variable of interest, ∆SP, is 
the average difference in specialization (in a given industry) between the acquirer and the target country over the 
sample period. We consider two measures of specialization, one based on sales (SP(sales)) and one based on 
employment (SP(emp)). In Panel A, we include country-pair fixed effects instead of average acquirer and target 
country characteristics and country-pair characteristics. In Panels B, C and D, we modify the measurement of 
industry specialization. In Panel B, we compute industry specialization using aggregate industry-level data from 
UNIDO (i.e. including all private and public firms in manufacturing industries for 43 countries). In Panel C, we 
compute industry specialization using firm-level data from Amadeus (i.e., including all private and public firms in all 
industries for 14 countries). In Panel D, compute industry specialization using aggregate industry-level data from 
KLEMS (i.e., including all private and public firms in all industries for 25 countries, with a coarser industry definition). 
The alternative measures of specialization are presented in Section IV.C. All variables are defined in Appendix 1. All 
specifications include industry fixed effects, with industries defined based on three-digit ISIC classification, except in 
Panel D (see Appendix 2). To facilitate economic interpretation, all dependent variables are standardized to have a 
unit variance. Standard errors are clustered at the acquirer-target country pair level. We report t-statistics in 
parenthesis. Symbols *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively.  
Dep. Variable: ln(#Acq.) ln($Acq.) 
SP(x): SP(sales) SP(emp) SP(sales) SP(emp) 
Panel A: Country-Pair Fixed Effects 
     
∆SP 0.115*** 0.112*** 0.466*** 0.438*** 
(10.11) (9.72) (6.98) (6.28) 
#Obs. 175,950 175,950 175,950 175,950 
Pseudo R2 0.10 0.10 0.08 0.08 
Panel B: Specialization based on UNIDO data 
     
∆SP 0.052*** 0.046** 0.189* 0.198* 
(2.87) (2.52) (1.78) (1.95) 
#Obs. 77,658 77,658 77,658 77,658 
Pseudo R2 0.32 0.32 0.22 0.22 
Panel C: Specialization based on AMADEUS data 
     
∆SP 0.106*** 0.121*** 0.552*** 0.573*** 
(5.39) (6.03) (4.64) (4.93) 
#Obs. 11,544 11,544 11,544 11,544 
Pseudo R2 0.29 0.29 0.20 0.20 
Panel D: Specialization based on KLEMS data 
     
∆SP 0.112*** 0.122*** 0.497*** 0.453*** 
(4.61) (5.12) (3.78) (3.24) 
#Obs. 15,708 15,708 15,708 15,708 
Pseudo R2 0.31 0.31 0.20 0.20 
          
 
 
Table 6: Country-Industry Characteristics (Controls) 
This table presents cross-sectional Tobit estimations of the baseline gravity specification (equation (2) in the text) 
augmented with several additional control variables measured at the country-industry level. The dependent variable is 
the total flow of cross-border horizontal acquisitions, in number (ln(#Acq.)) or dollar value (ln($Acq.)), in a given 
industry-country-pair over the 1990-2010 period. The variable of interest, ∆SP, is the average difference in 
specialization (in a given industry) between the acquirer and the target country over the sample period. We consider 
two measures of specialization, one based on sales (SP(sales)) and one based on employment (SP(emp)). We 
further include proxies for differences in size (∆Size), number of firms (∆Firms), valuation (∆MB), debt and cash ratios 
(∆Debt/A and ∆Cash/A), market power (∆(1-Lerner)), Herfindahl index (∆HHI),  ownership concentration (∆CHS), and 
global market shares (∆GMS) in a given industry between acquirer and target countries. Baseline control variables 
(average acquirer and target country characteristics and country-pair characteristics) are included but not reported. 
All variables are defined in Appendix 1. All specifications include industry fixed effects, with industries defined based 
on three-digit ISIC classification (see Appendix 2). To facilitate economic interpretation, all dependent variables are 
standardized to have a unit variance. Standard errors are clustered at the acquirer-target country pair level. We report 
t-statistics in parenthesis. Symbols *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, 
respectively. 
Dep. Variable: ln(#Acq.) ln($Acq.)  ln(#Acq.) ln($Acq.) 
SP(x): SP(sales) SP(emp) SP(sales) SP(emp)   SP(sales) SP(emp) SP(sales) SP(emp) 
          
∆SP 0.067*** 0.061*** 0.229*** 0.208***  0.105*** 0.070*** 0.383*** 0.260*** 
 (4.42) (4.35) (3.06) (2.97)  (5.93) (3.62) (4.22) (2.61) 
          
∆Size 0.106*** 0.110*** 0.526*** 0.538***      
 (7.90) (8.54) (7.36) (7.78)      
∆Firms 0.064*** 0.066*** 0.274*** 0.279***      
 (5.01) (5.14) (5.25) (5.36)      
∆MB 0.005 0.005 -0.015 -0.015      
 (0.36) (0.36) (-0.22) (-0.22)      
∆Debt/Assets 0.011 0.011 -0.019 -0.017      
 (0.85) (0.88) (-0.29) (-0.26)      
∆Cash/Assets 0.001 0.002 -0.018 -0.017      
 (0.11) (0.13) (-0.31) (-0.30)      
∆(1-Lerner) -0.026 -0.025 -0.106 -0.104      
 (-1.49) (-1.46) (-1.29) (-1.27)      
∆HHI -0.086*** -0.087*** -0.329*** -0.332***      
 (-5.23) (-5.27) (-4.36) (-4.40)      
∆CHS -0.01 -0.01 -0.08 -0.079      
 (-0.88) (-0.85) (-1.43) (-1.42)      
∆GMS      0.067*** 0.092*** 0.300*** 0.354*** 
      (3.37) (4.24) (3.29) (3.46) 
          
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
#Obs. 88,804 88,804 88,804 88,804  175,950 175,950 175,950 175,950 
Pseudo R2 0.28 0.28 0.19 0.19  0.31 0.31 0.22 0.22 
                    
 
Table 7: Country-Industry Characteristics (Human and Technological Capital) 
This table presents cross-sectional Tobit estimations similar to the baseline gravity model (equation (2)). The 
dependent variable is the total flow of cross-border horizontal acquisitions in a given industry-country pair over the 
period 1990-2010. The flow is in number of deals (ln(#Acq.)). The variables of interest are average differences in 
measures of intangibles in a given industry between the acquirer and the target country over the sample period 
(∆Intangibles). We consider seven measures of intangibles: the fraction of high skilled workers, the stock of software 
capital, the stock of information and communication technology (ICT) capital, the stock of R&D assets, the ratio of 
R&D to assets, all measured at country-industry-year level, and management quality measured at the country-
industry level. Baseline control variables (average acquirer and target country characteristics and country-pair 
characteristics) are included but not reported. All variables are defined in Appendix 1. All specifications include 
industry fixed effects, with industries defined based on three-digit ISIC classification (see Appendix 2). To facilitate 
economic interpretation, all dependent variables are standardized to have a unit variance. Standard errors are 
clustered at the acquirer-target country pair level. We report t-statistics in parenthesis. Symbols *, **, and *** indicate 
statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively.  
Dep. Variable: ln(#Acq.) 
Intangible: 
 
High Skill 
(%Comp) 
High Skill 
(%Hours) 
Software 
Stock 
ICT 
Stock 
R&D 
Stock 
R&D/Assets 
 
Management 
 
∆Intangibles 0.043*** 0.055*** 0.072*** 0.012 0.027*** 0.022*** 0.028 
(3.29) (4.18) (3.57) (0.06) (3.36) (2.87) (1.088) 
       
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
       
#Obs 34,196 34,196 11,544 11,544 94,020 94,020 8,756 
Pseudo R2 0.29 0.29 0.30 0.30 0.26 0.26 0.32 
 
 
 
  
 Table 8: Omitted Variables 
This table presents panel estimations of the baseline gravity specification (equation (2) in the text). The dependent 
variable is the total flow of acquisitions in number (ln(#Acq.)) or dollar value (ln($Acq.)) in a given industry-country-
pair-year. The variable of interest, ∆SP, is the difference in specialization (in a given industry and a given year) 
between the acquirer and the target country. The sample period is from 1990 to 2010. All specifications include time-
varying country-level control variables (similar to the baseline control variables). In Panel A, we estimate the baseline 
gravity specification using a Tobit model and include industry-country-pair fixed effects. In Panel B, we estimate the 
baseline gravity specification using the Fama and MacBeth (1973) methodology. In all specifications industries are 
defined based on three-digit ISIC classification (see Appendix 2). To facilitate economic interpretation, all dependent 
variables are standardized to have a unit variance. Standard errors are clustered at the acquirer-target country pair 
level. We report t-statistics in parenthesis. Symbols *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 
1% level, respectively.  
Dep. Variable: ln(#Acq.) ln($Acq.) 
SP(x): SP(sales) SP(emp) SP(sales) SP(emp) 
     
Panel A: Panel Tobit 
∆SP 0.008* 0.011** 0.068* 0.105*** 
(1.86) (2.41) (2.27) (3.25) 
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry-country-pair FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
#Obs. 3,694,950 3,694,950 3,694,950 3,694,950 
Pseudo R2 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 
     
Panel B: Fama and MacBeth 
∆SP 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001 
(7.191) (8.075) (5.473) (1.62) 
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
#Obs. 3,694,950 3,694,950 3,694,950 3,694,950 
Adj.R2 N/A N/A N/A N/A 
     
 
  
Table 9: Contracting and Exporting Costs 
This table presents cross-sectional Tobit estimations of the interacted gravity specification (equation (3) in the text). 
The dependent variable is the total flow of cross-border horizontal acquisitions in number (ln(#Acq.)) or dollar value 
(ln($Acq.)) in a given industry-country-pair over the 1990-2010 period. The variable ∆SP is the average difference in 
specialization (in a given industry) between the acquirer and the target country over the sample period. We consider 
two measures of specialization, one based on sales (SP(sales)) and one based on employment (SP(emp)). The 
interacted specification augments the baseline gravity specification (equation (3) in the text) with interaction terms 
between all baseline variables (∆SP and control variables) and proxies for (1) contracting costs in target countries, 
and (2) bilateral trade costs between the acquirer and target countries. We only report the estimated coefficients on 
the interaction between ∆SP and these proxies. In Panel A, we consider three variables as proxies for contracting 
costs: (1) the time required to enforce contracts, (2) the number of procedure to enforce contracts, and (3) an overall 
index of formal legal procedures. In Panel B, we consider two variables as proxies for bilateral exporting costs: (1) 
whether countries share a common border, (2) the geographic distance (in logs) between countries’ capital cities, and 
(3) bilateral trade between countries (in logs). All variables are defined in Appendix 1. All specifications include 
industry fixed effects, with industries defined based on three-digit ISIC classification (see Appendix 2). To facilitate 
economic interpretation, all dependent variables are standardized to have a unit variance. Standard errors are 
clustered at the acquirer-target country pair level. We report t-statistics in parenthesis. Symbols *, **, and *** indicate 
statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively.  
Dep.Variable: ln(#Acq.) ln($Acq.) 
SP(x): SP(sales) SP(emp)   SP(sales) SP(emp) 
Interaction Variable: Panel A: Contracting Costs in Target Country 
∆SP × Contracting Costs (procedures) 0.211*** 0.129** 1.001*** 0.599* 
(3.12) (2.11) (2.98) (1.79) 
∆SP × Contracting Costs (duration) 0.096*** 0.091*** 0.370*** 0.329*** 
(4.85) (4.77) (3.86) (3.30) 
∆SP × Contracting Costs (enforcement) 0.217*** 0.204*** 0.778*** 0.729*** 
(4.24) (4.14) (2.84) (2.70) 
Panel B: Bilateral Exporting Costs 
∆SP × Common Border -0.019*** -0.016** -0.076** -0.065* 
(-3.03) (-2.44) (-2.05) (-1.76) 
∆SP × ln(Geographic Distance) 0.153** 0.014*  0.450 0.236 
 (1.977) (1.90)  (1.09) (0.57) 
∆SP × ln(Bilateral Trade) -0.271*** -0.225*** -1.333*** -1.045** 
(-3.29) (-2.61) (-3.11) (-2.21) 
            
Table 10: Specialization Profile of Acquirers and Targets at the Deal-Level 
This table presents the mean and median degree of industry specialization between the acquirer’s industry and the 
target’s industry at the deal-level. We consider two measures of specialization, where SP(sales) is specialization 
based on total sales, and SP(emp) is specialization based on total employment. Data on sales and employment are 
from Worldscope. The sample covers 46 countries, 85 distinct industries and the period 1990-2010. Industries are 
defined based on three-digit ISIC classification (see Appendix 2). Panel A reports means and median values. We test 
for the significance of the mean (t-test) and median (sign-rank test) difference in the degree of specialization between 
the acquirer and target, and report the significance levels next to the mean and median for the acquirer. Symbols *, 
**, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. In Panel B we report the 
fraction of all horizontal cross-border deals and the fraction of the dollar value in these deals for which the degree of 
specialization of the acquirer is larger than that of the target (SP(x)Acquirer>SP(x)Target).  
Panel A  Domestic Cross-Border All 
 
SP(sales)Acquirer Mean: 2.165 1.981*** 2.124*** 
Median: 1.219 1.235*** 1.222 
 
SP(sales)Target Mean: 2.165 1.458 2.008 
Median: 1.219 0.858 1.124 
 
SP(emp)Acquirer Mean: 2.246 2.017*** 2.195*** 
Median: 1.036 1.083*** 1.046*** 
 
SP(emp)Target Mean: 2.246 1.467 2.073 
  Median: 1.036 0.768 0.963 
 
 
Panel B  %(# of deals)  
$ value  
 
%($ value) 
 
 
SP(sales)Acquirer  > SP(sales)Target  63.58% $2.38 Bn. 67.50% 
 
SP(emp)Acquirer > SP(emp)Target  63.06% $2.36 Bn. 66.90% 
         
   
  
Table 11: Selection Model at the Deal-Level 
This table presents estimates from probit models predicting firms’ participation in horizontal cross-border acquisitions. 
We create a sample of actual and potential deals constructed from all firms participating in horizontal cross-border 
acquisitions for which we have firm-level information. For each industry-year that features at least one deal, we create 
all possible cross-border transactions by pairing each acquirer to each target in that industry-year. This procedure 
generates 14,610 transactions, 680 of which are actual transactions. The dependent variable in the probit models is a 
dummy variable that is equal to one if a given pair of firms (acquirer-target) is an actual transaction and zero 
otherwise. The variable of interest, ∆SP, is the difference in industry specialization (in a given industry and year) 
between the acquirer and the target. We consider two measures of specialization, one based on sales (SP(sales)) 
and one based on employment (SP(emp)). All estimations include industry and year fixed effects, with industries 
defined based on three-digit ISIC classification (see Appendix 2). Estimations reported in columns (2) and (4) include 
the baseline country-level controls used in the baseline gravity specification (equation (3) in the text). Estimations 
reported in columns (3) and (6) further include acquirer and target characteristics (size, market-to-book, sales growth, 
cash-to-asset and debt-to-asset ratios, the fraction of foreign sales, ownership structure, and global market shares). 
To facilitate economic interpretation, all dependent variables are standardized to have a unit variance. Standard 
errors are clustered at the acquirer-target country pair level. We report t-statistics in parenthesis. Symbols *, **, and 
*** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively.  
Dep.Variable: Prob(Actual Deal) 
SP(x): SP(sales) SP(emp) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
∆SP 0.139*** 0.203*** 0.117** 0.123*** 0.228** 0.117** 
(2.97) (4.22) (2.20) (2.66) (4.55) (2.16) 
Acquirer and Target controls No No Yes No No Yes 
Country controls No Yes Yes No Yes Yes 
Industry and Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
#Obs. 14,610 14,514 12,220 14,610 14,514 12,220 
Pseudo R2 0.02 0.08 0.10 0.02 0.08 0.10 
              
 
  
Table 12: Market Reaction and Premiums 
This table presents OLS regressions on abnormal returns around deal announcement and premiums paid by 
acquirers. We compute acquirers and targets abnormal returns (CARs) over a three-day event window (-1,+1) around 
the deal announcement for all deals where acquirers or targets are publicly traded firms with returns data on 
Datastream. We estimate abnormal returns using a two-factor international market model, with local returns and the 
world-market return as factors. We estimate market models using daily dollar-denominated returns using 250 days 
preceding each transaction. We compute the combined value-weighted acquirer-target CARs using weights defined 
based on the relative market capitalization 10 days prior to the deal. We restrict our analysis to deals in which 
acquirers or targets are not involved in other types of deals (e.g. domestic or non-horizontal) during the quarter that 
precedes the deal. We measure the premium paid by acquirers using the price offered relative to the target stock 
price 30 days prior to the deal’s announcement (as reported by SDC). The variable of interest, ∆SP, is the difference 
in industry specialization (in a given industry and year) between the acquirer and the target. We consider two 
measures of specialization, one based on sales (SP(sales)) and one based on employment (SP(emp)). All 
estimations include deal-level controls (the log of deal value, dummy variables for whether the acquirer (or target) is 
private, whether the transaction is a merger, the number of bidders, the fraction of ownership held by the acquirer 
prior to (i.e. toehold) and after deal completion, and whether the acquisition is paid with stocks), firm-level controls 
(size, market-to-book, sales growth, cash-to-asset and debt-to-asset ratios, the fraction of foreign sales, ownership 
structure, previous year stock return , and global market shares), the baseline country-level controls used in the 
baseline gravity specification (equation (3) in the text), as well as industry and year fixed effects. We also include the 
previous year stock return of firms’ country-industry. Industries are defined based on three-digit ISIC classification 
(see Appendix 2). To facilitate economic interpretation, all dependent variables are standardized to have a unit 
variance. Standard errors are clustered at the acquirer-target country pair level. We report t-statistics in parenthesis. 
Symbols *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively.  
Panel A: Summary Statistics 
     
Variable: Acquirer CAR Target CAR Combined CAR Premium 
     
Mean 0.010 0.099 0.082 0.354 
Median 0.001 0.031 0.016 0.234 
#Deals 6,824 1,072 488 526 
     
     
     
Panel B: OLS Results 
     
Dep. Variable: Acquirer CAR Target CAR Combined CAR Premium 
SP(x) SP(sales) SP(emp) SP(sales) SP(emp) SP(sales) SP(emp) SP(sales) SP(emp) 
∆SP 0.002** 0.002** 0.021*** 0.016** 0.008 0.001 0.043* 0.061** 
(2.08) (2.22) (2.79) (2.14) (0.76) (0.10) (1.77) (1.98) 
Deal controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Acquirer controls Yes Yes No No Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Target controls No No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Countries controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Ind. and year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
#Deals 6,824 6,823 1,072 1,072 488 488 526 526 
Adj. R2 0.04 0.04 0.23 0.23 0.45 0.45 0.24 0.24 
                  
Table 13: Acquirers’ Ex Post Performance 
This table presents OLS regressions on acquirers’ change in performance following cross-border horizontal 
acquisitions. We define performance as operating income over assets, and examine changes from year t+1 to year 
t+1 (one-year horizon), or t+4 (three-year horizon), where t=0 is the year of the acquisition. We restrict to firms that 
only acquire assets in cross-border horizontal transactions over the three-year horizon. We adjust the performance of 
each acquirer by subtracting the performance of a matched peer, where peers are the closest firms in terms of size 
that are active in the country-industry of the acquirer and do not participate in any acquisition during a six-year 
window surrounding the transaction. The variable of interest, ∆SP, is the difference in specialization between the 
country-industry of the acquirer and that of the target, measured in year t=0. We consider two measures of 
specialization, one based on sales (SP(sales)) and one based on employment (SP(emp)). All specifications include 
the following control variables: logarithm of acquirer assets, the relative size of the acquirer compared to the target, 
and a dummy variable indicating whether the transaction is a merger. All the variables are defined in Appendix 1. 
Moreover, all specifications include industry and year fixed effects, and country-level controls. Industries are defined 
based on three-digit ISIC classification (see Appendix 2). To facilitate economic interpretation, all dependent 
variables are standardized to have a unit variance. Standard errors are clustered at the acquirer-target country pair 
level. We report t-statistics in parenthesis. Symbols *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 
1% level, respectively.    
Dep. Variable: Change in ROA  
SP(x): SP(sale) SP(emp) 
Horizon: one-year three-year one-year three-year   
∆SP 0.006** 0.006** 0.004* 0.005** 
(2.17) (2.45) (1.87) (1.96) 
Acquirer and Deal Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes  
Countries controls Yes Yes Yes Yes  
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes  
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes  
#Obs. 4,343 4,343 4,343 4,343 
Adj. R2 0.17 0.20 0.17 0.20 
            
Figure A: Difference in Industry Specialization by Acquirer Country (Sales) 
This figure presents the average difference in industry specialization between acquirers and target in horizontal 
cross-border acquisitions by acquirer country. SP(sales) is specialization based on total sales, as detailed in in 
Section III.A. Data on sales are from Worldscope. The sample covers 46 countries, 85 distinct industries and the 
period 1990-2010. Industries are defined based on three-digit ISIC classification (see Appendix 2).      
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure B: Difference in Industry Specialization by Target Country (Sales) 
This figure presents the average difference in industry specialization between acquirers and target in horizontal 
cross-border acquisitions by target country. SP(sales) is specialization based on total sales, as detailed in in Section 
III.A. Data on sales are from Worldscope. The sample covers 46 countries, 85 distinct industries and the period 1990-
2010. Industries are defined based on three-digit ISIC classification (see Appendix 2).     
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Figure C: Difference in Industry Specialization by Year (Sales) 
This figure presents the average difference in industry specialization between acquirers and target in horizontal 
cross-border acquisitions by year. SP(sales) is specialization based on total sales, as detailed in in Section III.A. Data 
on sales are from Worldscope. The sample covers 46 countries, 85 distinct industries and the period 1990-2010. 
Industries are defined based on three-digit ISIC classification (see Appendix 2).       
 
 
 
Figure D: Difference in Specialization by industry (Sales) 
This figure presents the average difference in industry specialization between acquirers and target in horizontal 
cross-border acquisitions by industry. SP(sales) is specialization based on total sales, as detailed in in Section III.A. 
Data on sales are from Worldscope. The sample covers 46 countries, 85 distinct industries and the period 1990-
2010. Industries are defined based on three-digit ISIC classification (see Appendix 2).       
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